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Causes, consequences, and cures of myopic loss aversion –An experimental investigation

Fellner, Gerlinde; Sutter, Matthias - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2008

We examine in an experiment the causes, consequences and possible cures ofmyopic loss aversion (MLA) for investment … behaviour under risk. We find thatboth, investment horizons and feedback frequency contribute almost equally tothe effects of … MLA. Longer investment horizons and less frequent feedbacklead to higher investments. However, when given the choice …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866463

The excess burden of tax evasion - An experimental detection-concealment contest

Bayer, Ralph-C.; Sutter, Matthias - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2003

with risk neutral tax payers predicts. We find evidence that this is rather due to individual moral constraints than due to … risk aversion. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866877

Experimental evidence of the importance of gender pairing in bargaining

Sutter, Matthias; Bosman, Ronald; Kocher, Martin; van … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2003

We study the influence of gender on economic decision making in a two-person bargaining game. By testing hypotheses derived from evolutionary psychology and social role theory, we find that (1) gender per se has no significant effect on behavior, whereas (2) gender pairing systematically affects...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866879

Tax evasion and state productivity - Anexperimental study

Güth, Werner; Strauß, Sabine; Sutter, Matthias - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2002

In an overlapping generations-experiment with multiple families participants caneither support their parents directly …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867009

Costly bargaining and renegotiation

Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo - London School of Economics (LSE) - 1998

We identify the inefficiencies that arise when negotiation between two parties takes place in the presence of transaction costs. First, for some values of these costs it is efficient to reach an agreement but the unique equilibrium outcome is one in which agreement is never reached. Secondly,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928645

Transaction costs and the robustness of the Coase Theorem

Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2000

This paper explores the extent to which the presence of ex-ante transaction costs may lead to failures of the Coase Theorem. In particular we identify and investigate the basic ‘hold-up problem’ which arises whenever the parties to a Coasian negotiation have to pay some ex-ante costs for the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745037

Costly coasian contracts

Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo - London School of Economics (LSE) - 1998

We identify and investigate the basic ‘hold-up problem’ which arises whenever each party to a contract has to pay some ex-ante cost for the contract to become feasible. We then proceed to show that, under plausible circumstances, a ‘contractual solution’ to this hold-up problem is not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745370

Individual behavior and group membership: Comment

Sutter, Matthias - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2008

making in teams. I find in an investment experiment that individual decisions withsalient group membership are largely the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866444

Individual or team decision-making –Causes and consequences of self-selection

Kocher, Martin; Strauß, Sabine; Sutter, Matthias - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2004

Even though decision-making in small teams is pervasive in business and in private life, littleis known about subjects’ preferences with respect to individual and team decision-making andabout the consequences of respecting these preferences. We report the results from anexperimental...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866770

Tournaments for the endogenous allocating of prizes within workteams - Theory and experimental evidence

Sutter, Matthias - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2004

We present a model where compensation within a workteam is determinedendogenously by the use of a rank-order tournament. Team memberscompete in their efforts for the right to propose the distribution of a prizewithin the team. The implementation of a proposal requires the approvalof other team...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866847