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Are preferences complete?An experimental measurement of indecisivenessunder risk

Danan, Eric; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2006

We propose an experimental design allowing a behavioral test of the axiom ofcompleteness of individual preferences. The … preferences are significantly incomplete. We use lotteries as choice alternatives and we find that risk aversion is globally …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866755

Individual and Couple Decision Behavior under Risk:The Power of Ultimate Control

de Palma, André; Picard, Nathalie; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2008

This paper reports results of an experiment designed to analyze the link between riskydecisions made by couples and … risky decisions made separately by each spouse. We estimateboth the spouses and the couples’ degrees of risk aversion and we … assess how the risk preferencesof the two spouses aggregate when they make risky decisions. This enables us to investigatethe …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866693

Hidden Costs of Control:Three Repetitions and an Extension

Ploner, Matteo; Schmelz, Katrin; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2010

We report three repetitions of Falk and Kosfeld's (2006) low and medium control treatmentswith 364 subjects. Each repetition employs a sample drawn from a standard subject pool ofstudents and demographics vary across samples. Our results largely conict with those of theoriginal study. We mainly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005870900

The Hidden Costs of Control:An Unsuccessful Replication Study

Ploner, Matteo; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2007

This note reports a replication study of Falk and Kosfeld’s (2006) medium control treatment.In the experimental game, an agent has an endowment of 120 experimental currency units anddecides how much to transfer to a principal. For every unit that the agent gives up, the principalreceives two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866534

Road Traffic Congestion and Public Information:An Experimental Investigation

Boun My, Kene; Denant-Boèmont, Laurent; Koessler, … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2006

This paper reports two laboratory studies designed to study the impact of public informationabout past departure rates on congestion levels and travel costs. Our experimental design isbased on a discrete version of Arnott, de Palma, and Lindsey’s (1990) bottleneck model wheresubjects have to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866696

Are preferences incomplete?An experimental study using flexible choices

Danan, Eric; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2004

Completeness, the most commonly assumed axiom in preference theory,has not received much attention from the experimental literature. Indeed,incomplete preferences model a cognitive phenomenon (an agent's inabilityto compare alternatives), and therefore cannot be directly revealed throughchoice...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866783

Costly bargaining and renegotiation

Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo - London School of Economics (LSE) - 1998

We identify the inefficiencies that arise when negotiation between two parties takes place in the presence of transaction costs. First, for some values of these costs it is efficient to reach an agreement but the unique equilibrium outcome is one in which agreement is never reached. Secondly,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928645

Transaction costs and the robustness of the Coase Theorem

Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2000

This paper explores the extent to which the presence of ex-ante transaction costs may lead to failures of the Coase Theorem. In particular we identify and investigate the basic ‘hold-up problem’ which arises whenever the parties to a Coasian negotiation have to pay some ex-ante costs for the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745037

Costly coasian contracts

Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo - London School of Economics (LSE) - 1998

We identify and investigate the basic ‘hold-up problem’ which arises whenever each party to a contract has to pay some ex-ante cost for the contract to become feasible. We then proceed to show that, under plausible circumstances, a ‘contractual solution’ to this hold-up problem is not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745370

Preference reversals and the analysis of income distributions

Amiel, Yoram; Cowell, Frank; Davidovitz, Leima; … - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2003

It is known from the literature on uncertainty that in cases where individuals express a preference for a high win-probability bet over a bet with high winnings they nevertheless will bid more to obtain the bet with high winnings. We investigate whether a similar phenomenon applies in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928778