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Valuing Protection against Low Probability,High Loss Risks: Experimental Evidence

Morone, Andrea; Ozdemir, Ozlem - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2006

measure,(3)calculates relative risk aversion. The results of the experiment indicate that as theprobability of loss and loss …The study investigates protective responses in low probability and high loss risk situations.Particularly, it (1 … women) are found to be risk aversefor low probabilities. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866644

Voluntary contributions with imperfect information:An experimental study

Fiore, Annamaria; Levati, M. Vittoria; Morone, Andrea - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2006

examine the effect of imperfect information on contributions levels. To assess prior risk attitudes, individual valuations of … clear evidence of risk aversion, and of a negative relationship between the latter and willingness to cooperate. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866650

Costly bargaining and renegotiation

Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo - London School of Economics (LSE) - 1998

We identify the inefficiencies that arise when negotiation between two parties takes place in the presence of transaction costs. First, for some values of these costs it is efficient to reach an agreement but the unique equilibrium outcome is one in which agreement is never reached. Secondly,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928645

Transaction costs and the robustness of the Coase Theorem

Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2000

This paper explores the extent to which the presence of ex-ante transaction costs may lead to failures of the Coase Theorem. In particular we identify and investigate the basic ‘hold-up problem’ which arises whenever the parties to a Coasian negotiation have to pay some ex-ante costs for the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745037

Costly coasian contracts

Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo - London School of Economics (LSE) - 1998

We identify and investigate the basic ‘hold-up problem’ which arises whenever each party to a contract has to pay some ex-ante cost for the contract to become feasible. We then proceed to show that, under plausible circumstances, a ‘contractual solution’ to this hold-up problem is not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745370

On the Absorbability of the Guessing Game Theory -A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis

Morone, Andrea; Sandri, Serena; Uske, Tobias - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2006

absorptionand experimentally test the effects of informing none, some, or all playersabout how to derive equilibrium predictions. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866646

Voluntary contributions with risky and uncertain marginalreturns: the importance of the minimal value

Levati, Maria Vittoria; Morone, Andrea - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2009

contributions. This paper presentsexperimental results illustrating that the effects of risk and uncertainty dependon the employed … efficiency gains,the presence of risk and uncertainty about the public good’s value is not detrimentalto cooperation. This …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866390

Eliciting Environmental Preferences of Ghanaians:an Experimental Approach

Meroz, Yael; Morone, Andrea; Morone, Piergiuseppe - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2007

answer to both issues, showing how using anincentive compatible experiment produces, in the case of Ghana, reliable results …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866538