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Black swan protection: an experimental investigation

Morone, Andrea; Ozdemir, Ozlem - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

This experimental study investigates insurance decisions in low-probability, high-loss risk situations. Results … individuals are risk averse with no specific threshold probability. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011110638

Do Women Have More Shame than Men? An Experiment on Self-Assessment and the Shame of Overestimating Oneself

Ludwig, Sandra; Thoma, Carmen - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

We analyze how subjects’ self-assessment depends on whether its accuracy is observable to others. We find that women downgrade their selfassessment given observability while men do not. Women avoid the shame they may have if others observe that they overestimated themselves. Men, however, do...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011274508

Can Violence Harm Cooperation? Experimental Evidence

De Luca, Giacomo; Sekeris, Petros; Spengler, Dominic - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2015

While folk theorems for dynamic renewable common pool resource games sustain cooperation as an equilibrium, the possibility of reverting to violence to appropriate the resource destroys the incentives to cooperate, because of the expectation of conflict when resources are sufficiently depleted....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011262754

Risk Taking in Winner-Take-All Competition

Kräkel, Matthias; Nieken, Petra; Przemeck, Judith - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

We analyze a two-stage game between two heterogeneous players. At stage one, common risk is chosen by one of the … players. At stage two, both players observe the given level of risk and simultaneously invest in a winner-take-all competition … risk taking at stage one - an effort effect, a likelihood effect and a reversed likelihood effect. For the likelihood …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785871

Cheating and loss aversion: do people lie more to avoid a loss?

Grolleau, Gilles; Kocher, Martin G.; Sutan, Angela - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

Does the extent of cheating depend on a proper reference point? We use a real effort task that implements a two (gain versus loss frame) times two (monitored performance versus unmonitored performance) between-subjects design to examine whether cheating is reference-dependent. Our experimental...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010897335

Is Underconfidence Favored over Overconfidence? An Experiment on the Perception of a Biased Self-Assessment

Thoma, Carmen - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

This paper reports findings of a laboratory experiment, which explores how elfassessment regarding the own relative …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010897341

Fight Alone or Together? The Need to Belong

Ke, Changxia - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

Alliances often face both free-riding and hold-up problems, which under- mine the effectiveness of alliances in mobilizing joint fighting effort. Despite of these disadvantages, alliances are still ubiquitous in all types of contests. This paper asks if there are non-monetary incentives to form...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010699429

The effects of punishment in dynamic public-good games

Guererk, Oezguer; Rockenbach, Bettina; Wolff, Irenaeus - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

Considerable experimental evidence shows that although costly peer-punishment enhances cooperation in repeated public-good games, heavy punishment in early rounds leads to average period payoffs below the non-cooperative equilibrium benchmark. In an environment where past payoffs determine...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008536056

Performance Pay and Multidimensional Sorting - Productivity, Preferences and Gender

Dohmen, Thomas; Falk, Armin - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

This paper studies the impact of incentives on worker self-selection in a controlled laboratory experiment. Subjects …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009004024

Reference Points and Effort Provision

Abeler, Johannes; Falk, Armin; Götte, Lorenz; Huffman, … - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

candidate is expectations: what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs. In a real-effort experiment …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009004026