We examine the influence of cross country differences on debt maturity for small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) using a sample of 3366 SMEs from 19 European countries. We analyze a country's legal environment, institutional environment, banking structure and economic situation while...

This paper examines the impact of country specific determinants on multiple banking using a unique survey sample of 4959 SMEs from 19 European countries. Our data shows that (1) SMEs in countries with inefficient loan enforcement mechanisms are more likely to maintain multiple bank...

The aim of the paper is to show that e-commerce holds the potential to transform banking and financial systems. There are three aspects in which e-commerce can affect banking and finance. First, banks and financial firms can use the technology and business practice of e-commerce to market their...

We analyze regulatory capital requirements where the amount of required capital depends on the level of risk reported by the banks. It is shown that if the supervisors have a limited ability to identify or to sanction dishonest banks, an additional risk-independent leverage ration restriction...

In this paper we use insights from organizational economics and financial regulation to studythe optimal architecture of supervision. We suggest that the new architecture should revolvearound the following principles: (i) banking, securities and insurance supervision should befurther integrated;...

The objective of this paper is to propose a model to assess risk for banks. Its main innovation is to incorporate endogenous interaction between banks, recognising that the actual risk to which an individual bank is exposed also depends on its interaction with other banks and other private...

This paper proposes a measure of financial fragility that is based on economic welfare in a general equilbrium model calibrated against UK data. The model comprises a household sector, three active heterogeneous banks, a central bank/regulator, incomplete markets, and endogenous default. We...

We analyze regulatory capital requirements where the amount of required capital depends on the level of risk reported by the banks. It is shown that if the supervisors have a limited ability to identify or to sanction dishonest banks, an additional risk-independent leverage ration restriction...