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Productivity differences in the airline industry: partial deregulation versus short-run protection

Marin, Pedro L. - London School of Economics (LSE) - 1995

characteristics and efficiency as the main determinants of their productivity. The application of this analysis to the European market … shows that productivity differences among flag carriers could explain the governments' different views about deregulation at …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745526

A DIRECT TEST OF THE EFFICIENCY WAGE MODEL USING UK MICRO- DATA

WADHWANI, S.; WALL, M. - London School of Economics (LSE) - 1988

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005776294

Teachers before the 'threshold'

Marsden, David - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2000

During the summer of 2000, the government will introduce a new system of pay and performance management for teachers. The Centre for Economic Performance is conducting a ‘before-andafter’ panel study of teachers and schools to ascertain its effects on motivation and performance. This paper...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745316

Performance pay for teachers: linking individual and organisational level targets

Belfield, Richard; Marsden, David - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2005

The introduction of performance-related pay and performance management schemes in the maintained, state, school sector represents a considerable change in the school management system. This paper combines the results of opinion surveys of classroom and head teachers with Department for Education...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745401

The changing architecture of the UK welfare state

Hills, John - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2011

This article looks at the way in which the role of the state has evolved within different aspects of welfare activity (broadly defined) in the United Kingdom since 1979 and forward to the possible impacts of the plans of the Coalition government that took office in 2010 for changing that role...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745960

Does performance pay de-motivate, and does it matter?

French, Stephen; Kubo, Katsuyuki; Marsden, David - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2001

The sheer scale and speed of the shift of payment system from time-based salaries to performancerelated pay, PRP, in the British public services provides a unique opportunity to test the effects of incentive pay schemes. This study is based on the first large scale survey designed to measure the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746440

Achieving innovation in central government organisations

Dunleavy, Patrick; Margetts, Helen; Bastow, Simon; … - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2006

The role of innovations in improving government productivity and the effectiveness of services has previously been … of either political or ministerial pressures or efficiency drives. However, once this external trigger is provided … productivity data, communicating more simply to staff what kinds of innovations can be helpful, encouraging some counter …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071225

Pay for performance where output is hard to measure: the case of performance pay for school teachers

Marsden, David; Belfield, Richard - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2006

The introduction of performance-related pay with Performance Management in the state school sector of England and Wales represents a considerable change in the school management system. After 2000, all teachers were subject to annual goal setting performance reviews. Experienced teachers were...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928638

WAGES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LEGISLATION: THE CASE FOR COMPULSORY ARBITRATION.

CURRIE, J.; MCCONNELL, S. - London School of Economics (LSE) - 1989

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005625913

The effect of monitoring on CEO pay practices in a matching equilibrium

Chaigneau, Pierre; Sahuguet, Nicolas - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2013

We present a model of efficient contracting with endogenous matching and limited monitoring in which firms compete for CEOs. The model explains the association between limited monitoring and CEO pay practices such as pay-for-luck, high salaries, a low pay-performance sensitivity, and a more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746551

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