The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is proposing to introduce, in 2006, new risk-based requirements for internationally active (and other significant) banks. These will replace the relatively risk-invariant requirements in the current Accord. This article examines the implications of this...

This paper extends the model proposed by Goodhart, Sunirand, and Tsomocos (2003, 2004a, b) to an infinite horizon setting. Thus, we are able to assess how the model conforms with the time series data of the U.K. banking system. We conclude that, since the model performs satisfactorily, it can be...

We show, in an exchange economy with default, liquidity constraints and no aggregate uncertainty, that state prices in a complete markets general equilibrium are a function of the supply of liquidity by the Central Bank. Our model is derived along the lines of Dubey and Geanakoplos (1992). Two...

Our purpose in this paper is to produce a tractable model which illuminates problems relating to individual bank behaviour and risk-taking, to possible contagious interrelationships between banks, and to the appropriate design of prudential requirements and incentives to limit ‘excessive’...

The objective of this paper is to propose a model to assess risk for banks. Its main innovation is to incorporate endogenous interaction between banks, recognising that the actual risk to which an individual bank is exposed also depends on its interaction with other banks and other private...

This paper proposes a measure of financial fragility that is based on economic welfare in a general equilbrium model calibrated against UK data. The model comprises a household sector, three active heterogeneous banks, a central bank/regulator, incomplete markets, and endogenous default. We...

The purpose of our work is to explore contagious financial crises. To this end, we use simplified, thus numerically solvable, versions of our general model [Goodhart, Sunirand and Tsomocos (2003)]. The model incorporates heterogeneous agents, banks and endogenous default, thus allowing various...

Not only in the classic Arrow-Debreu model, but also in many mainstream macro models, an implicit assumption is that all agents honour their obligations, and thus there is no possibility of default. That leads to well-known problems in providing an essential role for either money or for...

This paper contains a general equilibrium model of an economy with incomplete markets (GEI) with money and default. The model is a simplified version of the real world consisting of a non-bank private sector, banks, a central bank, a government and a regulator. The model is used to analyse...