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The dynamics of venture capital contracts

Bienz, Carsten; Hirsch, Julia - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2005

We analyze the degree of contract completeness with respect to staging of venture capital investments using a hand-collected German data set of contract data from 464 rounds into 290 entrepreneurial firms. We distinguish three forms of staging (pure milestone financing, pure round financing and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746202

Intra-firm trade and product contractibility (Long Version)

Bernard, Andrew B.; Redding, Stephen - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2010

This paper examines the determinants of intra-firm trade in U.S. imports using detailed countryproductdata. We create a new measure of product contractibility based on the degree ofintermediation in international trade for the product. We find important roles for the interaction ofcountry and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746596

Law enforcement under incomplete law: theory and evidence from financial market regulation

Pistor, Katharina; Xu, Cheng-Gang - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2002

This paper studies the design of law-making and law enforcement institutions based on the premise that law is inherently incomplete. Under incomplete law, law enforcement by courts may suffer from deterrence failure, defined as the socialwelfare loss that results from the regime's inability to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746149

Anti-herding and strategic consultation

Levy, Gilat - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2004

decision makers who are motivated by reputation concerns tend to ‘anti-herding’, i.e., they excessively contradict public …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928812

Reputation and allocation of ownership

Halonen, Maija - London School of Economics (LSE) - 1995

We show that allocation of ownership matters even in a long-term relationship where problems of opportunism are less severe unless agents are very patient. Ownership structure is chosen to give the agents best incentives to cooperate. The optimal control structure of the static game restricts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928815

The broadening spectrum of reputation risk in organizations: banking on risk and trust relationships

Scott, Susan V.; Walsham, Geoff - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2004

Globalizing knowledge economies foster conditions that intensify the role and value of organizational reputation risk …. In a holistic, enterprise focused era reputation is a key strategic construct that can act as a boundary object linking … reputation risk. Having noted the ambivalence that surrounds ‘risk positions’, we present a re-definition of reputation risk that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010744830

IMF concern for reputation and conditional lending failure: theory and empirics

Marchesi, Silvia; Sabani, Laura - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2005

order to preserve its reputation of being a good monitor, may actually distort its lending decisions towards greater laxity … between a country and the IMF. The longer this relationship, the stronger the IMF reputation will be affected in case it …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745315

Do reputational concerns lead to reliable ratings?

Mariano, Beatriz - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2008

This paper examines to what extent reputational concerns give rating agencies incentives to reveal information. It demonstrates that, in a simple model in which a rating agency has public and private information about a project, it may ignore private information and even contradict public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745887

Self-confidence and survival

Bar-Isaac, Heski - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2001

We consider the impact of history on the survival of a monopolist selling single units in discrete time periods, whose quality is learned slowly. If the seller learns her own quality at the same rate as customers, a sufficiently bad run of luck could induce her to stop selling. When she knows...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746467

Banking on trust: managing reputation risk in financial service organizations

Scott, Susan V.; Walsham, Geoff - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2002

In this paper we introduce concepts that build a theoretical notion of reputation risk and establish the need to extend … our approach to managing such risk.. The existing literature on reputation risk has tended to be reactive and focus on … corrosive may present an occasion for creative management. We suggest that proactive reputation risk policies and practices are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746546