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EFFICIENT BARGAINS AND THE MCDONALD-SOLOW CONJECTURE.

CLARK, A. - London School of Economics (LSE) - 1989

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005776295

Congestion-dependent pricing and forward contracts for complementary segments of a communication network

Reiter, Miklós; Steinberg, Richard - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2012

cost uncertainty for users, it has been suggested that forward contracts could be used to manage these risks. We develop a … forward contracts would be adopted by service providers. Service on the upstream segment is provided by a single Internet … downstream network segment, with the advance possibility of entering into forward contracts with their users for some of their …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071433

Hierarchic contracting

Sanchez, Miguel A.; Hortala-Vallve, Rafael - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2005

externality arises between them. This externality is not internalised by a centralised structure where the principal contracts …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928768

The value of insolvency safe harbours

Paech, Philipp - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2015

‘Safe harbour’ is shorthand for a bundle of privileges in insolvency which are typically afforded to financial institutions. They are remotely comparable to security interests as they provide a financial institution with a considerably better position as compared to other creditors should...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011264787

The lifecycle of the financial sector and other speculative industries

Biais, Bruno; Rochet, Jean-Charles; Woolley, Paul - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2009

Speculative industries exploit novel technologies subject to two risks. First, there is uncertainty about the fundamental value of the innovation: is it strong or fragile? Second, it is difficult to monitor managers, which creates moral hazard. Because of moral hazard, managers earn agency rents...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010744809

Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover

Anderson, Ronald W.; Bustamante, Maria Cecilia; … - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2012

We study the relation between firm growth and managerial incentive provision under moral hazard when a long-lived firm is operated by a sequence of managers. In our model, firms replace their managers not only upon poor performance to provide incentives, but also when outside managers are at a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745265

Central banks and financial crises

Buiter, Willem H. - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2008

The paper draws lessons from the experience of the past year for the conduct of central banks in the pursuit of macroeconomic and financial stability. Macroeconomic stability is defined as either price stability or as price stability and sustainable output or employment growth. Financial...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745389

Loan maturity and renegotiation evidence from the lending practices of large and small banks

Albertazzi, Ugo - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2007

Corporate finance theories suggest that problems of asymmetric information and moral hazard in credit markets can be addressed by choosing short-term maturities. Theories of debt renegotiation suggest that the credibility of the implicit commitment to not make concessions to insolvent borrowers,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745643

Choice of corporate risk management tools under moral hazard

Bena, Jan - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2006

This paper examines the choice of tools for managing a firm’s operational risks: cash reserves, insurance contracts …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745872

Enforcement-proof contracts with moral hazard in precaution: ensuring ‘permanence’ in carbon sequestration

MacKenzie, Ian A.; Ohndorf, Markus; Palmer, Charles - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2010

carbon sequestration contracts. In this paper, an enforcement-proof incentive contract is developed in which a buyer demands … potential for opportunistic contract breach. The optimal design of forest carbon contracts to ensure permanence is derived …-best levels. Assigning liability is shown to have implications for forest carbon contracts in an international climate policy …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745900