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decision makers who are motivated by reputation concerns tend to ‘anti-herding’, i.e., they excessively contradict public … information truthfully. Even if the advisers care only about the outcome, they bias their recommendation since they anticipate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928812
order to preserve its reputation of being a good monitor, may actually distort its lending decisions towards greater laxity … between a country and the IMF. The longer this relationship, the stronger the IMF reputation will be affected in case it …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745315
This paper examines to what extent reputational concerns give rating agencies incentives to reveal information. It demonstrates that, in a simple model in which a rating agency has public and private information about a project, it may ignore private information and even contradict public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745887
find that when agents are concerned about their reputation, consultation results in sub-optimal sharing of information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746684
The paper studies credible information transmission by governments. A group of heterogenous individuals have to make private investment and labour supply decisions while relying on the government for information about investment returns. The government consists of an elected citizen who chooses...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928656
Does the distribution of land rights affect the choice of contractible techniques? I present evidence suggesting that Nicaraguan farmers are more likely to grow effort-intensive crops on owned rather than on rented plots. I consider two theoretical arguments that illustrate why property rights...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928686
When fairly homogeneous taxpayers are affected by common income shocks, a tax agency’s optimal auditing strategy consists of auditing a low-income declarer with a probability that (weakly) increases with the other taxpayers’ declarations. Such policy generates a coordination game among...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928739
We propose a theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs. A principal delegates part of his authority to a supervisor who can acquire soft information about an agent's productivity. If the supervisor were risk-neutral, the principal would simply make the better informed supervisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928775
We are concerned with the design of a constitution for a firm - an ex ante contract which assigns residual rights of control (and possibly residual income rights) without reference to the issue to be decided. We focus attention on two polar constitutions: non-profit cooperatives and outside...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928786
This paper shows that the inability of regulators to commit to long-term contracts is irrelevant when there is some competition between regulated firms and when firms' private information is correlated. This sharply contrasts with the dynamic of regulation without such competition. The paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010744985