Showing 1 - 10 of 63
The amount of political information that voters decide to acquire during an electoral campaign depends, among other … candidates attach little value to information because they perceive that voting itself will have little value. Voters that are ex … ante very ideological also attach little value to information because they think that the news will hardly change their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745271
A number of recent formal models predict a positive effect of political knowledge on turnout. Both information … proxies of information supply on mass media. Using survey data from the 1997 British General Election Study, I show that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746429
decisions to changes in the environment. We show that even if lower-level managers have superior information about local … conditions, and incentive conflicts are negligible, a centralized organization can be better at adapting to local information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011126298
positive, though imperfect, information sells for the same number of periods whether her information is private or public. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746467
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011126646
This paper proposes an equilibrium concept for a class of games in which players make irreversible costly decisions …; these games have been widely used in the recent I.O. literature. The equilibrium concept is defined, not in the space of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746422
We study a contracting model with unforeseen contingencies in which the court is an active player. Ex-ante, the contracting parties cannot include the risky unforeseen contingencies in the contract they draw up. Ex-post the court observes whether an unforeseen contingency occurred, and decides...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928636
We embed a simple contracting model with ex-ante investments in which there is scope for Court intervention in a full-blown open-ended dynamic setting. The underlying preferences of both Courts and contracting parties are fully forward looking and unbiased. Our point of departure is instead the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746104
-neutral agents, asymmetric information and ex-ante investments. The court must decide when to uphold a contract and when to void it …. The parties know their private information at the time of contracting, and this drives a wedge between ex-ante and interim …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071363
We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. The model we analyze is the same as in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006). An active court can improve on the outcome that the parties would achieve without it. The institutional role of the court is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071455