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Product differentiation, uncertainty and the stability of collusion

Raith, Michael A. - London School of Economics (LSE) - 1996

The conventional view that product heterogeneity limits the scope for collusion among oligolpolists has been challenged … leads to a decrease in the correlation of the firms? demand shocks. With imperfect monitoring, this makes collusion more …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746624

Sales and collusion in a market with storage

Nava, Francesco - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2006

buyers have heterogeneous storage technologies, periodic sales may facilitate collusion by magnifying intertemporal linking …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884541

Sales and collusion in a market with storage

Nava, Francesco; Schiraldi, Pasquale - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2013

must periodically reduce prices in order to sustain collusion when goods are storable and the market is large. The largest …. Sales foster collusion, by magnifying the intertemporal links in consumers' decisions. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071258

Cartel stability under capacity constraints: the traditional view restored

Nocke, Volker - London School of Economics (LSE) - 1999

The existence of a negative relationship between cartel stability and the level of excess capacity in an industry has for a long time been the dominant view in the traditional IO literature. Recent supergame-theoretic contributions (e.g. Brock and Scheinkman, 1985) appear to show that this view...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745124

Underinvestment and market structure

Nocke, Volker - London School of Economics (LSE) - 1998

This paper analyses a dynamic game of investment in R&D or advertising, where current investments change future market conditions. It investigates whether underinvestment can be supported in equilibrium by the threat of escalation in investment outlays. When there are no spillovers, or there is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745545

Inferring conduct under the threat of entry: the case of the Brazilian cement industry

Salvo, Alberto - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2004

This paper demonstrates that when an industry faces potential entry and this threat of entry constrains pre-entry prices, cost and conduct are not identified from the comparative statics of equilibrium. In such a setting, the identifying assumption behind the well-established technique of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746001

Follower payoffs in symmetric duopoly games

von Stengel, Bernhard - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2010

This paper compares the leader and follower payoff in a duopoly game, as they arise in sequential play, with the Nash payoff in simultaneous play. If the game is symmetric, has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, and players' payoffs are monotonic in the opponent's choice along their own best...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010744848

A general analysis of sequential merger games with an application to cross-border mergers

Salvo, Alberto - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2004

condition --Sutton's (1991) vertically-differentiated oligopoly and Perry and Porter's (1985) fixed-supply-of-capital model. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745143

Contract structure, risk sharing and investment choice

Fischer, Gregory - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2011

Few microfinance-funded businesses grow beyond subsistence entrepreneurship. This paper considers one possible explanation: that the structure of existing microfinance contracts may discourage risky but high-expected return investments. To explore this possibility, I develop a theory that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746368

Risk averse supervisors and the efficiency of collusion

Faure-Grimaud, Antoine; Laffont, Jean-Jacques; … - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2002

This paper studies the efficiency of collusion between supervisors and supervisees. Building on Tirole (1986)’s results … that deterring collusion with infinitely risk averse supervisors is impossible, while it is costless to do so under risk … neutrality, we develop here a theory of collusion based on a trade-off between the risk premia required by (less extreme) risk …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928620