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Ownership and managerial competition: employee, customer, or outside ownership
Bolton, Patrick; Xu, Cheng-Gang - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2001
This paper centres around the question of ownership of firms and managerial competition and how these affect managers … affected by both ownership and competition since both ownership structure and competition provide bargaining chips to employees … fierce market competition and no lock-in the allocation of ownership does not play a role (as one might expect), provided …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928689
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Convergence of firm-level productivity, globalisation, information technology and competition: evidence from France
Chevalier, Paul-Antoine; Lecat, Rémy; Oulton, Nicholas - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2009
stylised facts are considered: globalisation, information technology, and competition. Globalisation and information technology … may have benefited the most productive firms more and the growth of competition may at the same time have stimulated the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010744856
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Competition and opportunistic advice of financial analysts: theory and evidence
Sette, Enrico - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2007
competition, measured as the strength of coverage of a stock from other analysts. The interaction among analysts and investors is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071323
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Regulated and non-regulated companies, technology adoption in experimental markets for emission permits, and options contracts
Chesney, Marc; Taschini, Luca; Wang, Mei - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2011
This paper examines the investment strategies of regulated companies in abatement technologies, market participants' trading behaviors, and the liquidity level in an inter-temporal cap{and{trade market using laboratory experiments. The experimental analysis is performed under varying market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745458
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Costly bargaining and renegotiation
Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo - London School of Economics (LSE) - 1998
We identify the inefficiencies that arise when negotiation between two parties takes place in the presence of transaction costs. First, for some values of these costs it is efficient to reach an agreement but the unique equilibrium outcome is one in which agreement is never reached. Secondly,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928645
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Coordinating tasks in M-form and U-form organisations
Qian, Yingyi; Roland, Gerard; Xu, Cheng-Gang - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2003
We model the coordination of specialised tasks inside an organisation as "attribute matching". Using this method, we compare the performance of organisational forms (M-form and U-form) in implementing changes such as innovation and reform. In our framework, organisational forms affect the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928762
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Hierarchic contracting
Sanchez, Miguel A.; Hortala-Vallve, Rafael - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2005
We analyze the contracting structure in a moral hazard setting with several agents where output is produced jointly and is the only contractible variable. Since the salary of each agent is a function of all agents efforts, a positive externality arises between them. This externality is not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928768
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Transaction costs and the robustness of the Coase Theorem
Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2000
This paper explores the extent to which the presence of ex-ante transaction costs may lead to failures of the Coase Theorem. In particular we identify and investigate the basic ‘hold-up problem’ which arises whenever the parties to a Coasian negotiation have to pay some ex-ante costs for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745037
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Costly coasian contracts
Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo - London School of Economics (LSE) - 1998
We identify and investigate the basic ‘hold-up problem’ which arises whenever each party to a contract has to pay some ex-ante cost for the contract to become feasible. We then proceed to show that, under plausible circumstances, a ‘contractual solution’ to this hold-up problem is not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745370
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Evolution of decision and control rights in venture capital contracts: an empirical analysis
Bienz, Carsten; Walz, Uwe - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2006
We analyze the structure and evolution of the allocation of decision and control rights in venture capital contracts by using a sample of 464 contracts between venture capitalists (VC) and portfolio firms from Germany. We focus on the evolution of control and decisions rights along three time...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745436