Sales are a widespread and well-known phenomenon documented in several product markets. This paper presents a novel rationale for sales that does not rely on consumer heterogeneity, or on any form of randomness to explain such periodic price fluctuations. The analysis is carried out in the...

The paper discusses community enforcement in infinitely repeated two-action games with local monitoring. Each player interacts with and observes only a fixed set of partners, of whom he is privately informed. The main result shows that for generic beliefs efficiency can be sustained in a...

This paper investigates how quantity competition operates in economies in which a network describes the set of feasible trades. A general equilibrium model is presented in which prices and .ows of goods are endogenously determined. In such economies equilibrium dictates whether an individual...

Sales are a widespread and well-known phenomenon that has been documented in several product markets. Regularities in such periodic price reductions appear to suggest that the phenomenon cannot be entirely attributed to random variations in supply, demand, or the aggregate price level. Certain...

The paper discusses community enforcement in infinitely repeated, two-action games with local interaction and uncertain monitoring. Each player interacts with and observes only a fixed set of opponents, of whom he is privately informed. the main result shows that when beliefs about the...

We show FC-MNL is flexible in the sense of Diewert (1974), thus its parameters can be chosen to match a well-defined class of possible own- and cross-price elasticities of demand. In contrast to models such as Probit and Random Coefficient-MNL models, FC-MNL does not require estimation via...

This paper specifies and estimates a structural dynamic model of consumer demand for new and used durable goods. Its primary contribution is to provide an explicit estimation procedure for transaction costs, which are crucial to capturing the dynamic nature of consumer decisions. In particular,...

A monopolist launches a new product to distinct markets. The monopolist does not know the quality of the product while consumers in each market receive some private information about the quality. We study how the monopolist may in°uence consumer learning by manipulating the launching sequence...