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Entry and asymmetric lobbying: why governments pick losers

Baldwin, Richard E.; Robert-Nicoud, Frédéric - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2007

sectors. We explain this with a lobbying model that allows for entry and sunk costs. Specifically, policy is influenced by … pressure groups that incur lobbying expenses to create rents. In expanding industries, entry tends to erode such rents, but in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884692

Government corruption and legislative procedures: is one chamber better than two?

Testa, Cecilia - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2003

This paper studies the impact of the competition between lobbies and voters on policy outcomes under alternative legislative procedures. Lobbies and citizens have opposing interests in a public policy and offer money and votes, respectively, to legislators to obtain their preferred policy....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928625

Revolving door lobbyists

Blanes i Vidal, Jordi; Draca, Mirko; Fons-Rosen, Christian - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2010

Washington's 'revolving door' - the movement from government service into the lobbying industry - is regarded as a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745205

On the limits of communication in multidimensional cheap talk

Levy, Gilat; Razin, Ronny - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745236

Homeownership and land use controls: a dynamic model with voting and lobbying

Hilber, Christian A. L.; Robert-Nicoud, Frédéric - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2007

interpreted as the reduced form of various political economy models of voting and lobbying. We consider three special cases: a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745559