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Digit ratio (2D:4D) and altruism: evidence from a large, multi-ethnic sample

Galizzi, Matteo M.; Nieboer, Jeroen - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2015

We look at the links between the Digit Ratio - the ratio of the length of the index finger to the length of the ring finger – for both right and left hands, and giving in a Dictator Game. Unlike previous studies with exclusively Caucasian subjects, we recruited a large, ethnically diverse...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011171763

Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover

Anderson, Ronald W.; Bustamante, Maria Cecilia; … - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2012

We study the relation between firm growth and managerial incentive provision under moral hazard when a long-lived firm is operated by a sequence of managers. In our model, firms replace their managers not only upon poor performance to provide incentives, but also when outside managers are at a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745265

Evolution of decision and control rights in venture capital contracts: an empirical analysis

Bienz, Carsten; Walz, Uwe - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2006

We analyze the structure and evolution of the allocation of decision and control rights in venture capital contracts by … of control and decisions rights along three time dimensions: the point in time when the contract was signed, the expected … duration of the contract and the actual duration of the relationship. We show that contracts are not static but that control …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745436

The dynamics of venture capital contracts

Bienz, Carsten; Hirsch, Julia - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2005

We analyze the degree of contract completeness with respect to staging of venture capital investments using a hand-collected German data set of contract data from 464 rounds into 290 entrepreneurial firms. We distinguish three forms of staging (pure milestone financing, pure round financing and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746202

The effect of monitoring on CEO pay practices in a matching equilibrium

Chaigneau, Pierre; Sahuguet, Nicolas - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2013

We present a model of efficient contracting with endogenous matching and limited monitoring in which firms compete for CEOs. The model explains the association between limited monitoring and CEO pay practices such as pay-for-luck, high salaries, a low pay-performance sensitivity, and a more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746551

Moral hazard and renegotiation of multi-signal contracts

Bijapur, Mohan - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2011

We study the costs and benefits of additional information in agency contracts, when there is the possibility of renegotiation. The literature to date assumes that contractual simplicity, i.e. the omission of informative contractual contingencies, can only arise in multi-period environments, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011126387

Optimal contracting and the organization of knowledge

Fuchs, William; Garicano, Luis; Rayo, Luis - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2014

We study contractual arrangements that support an efficient use of time in a knowledge-intensive economy in which agents endogenously specialize in either production or consulting. The resulting market for advice is plagued by informational problems, since both the difficulty of the questions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011126635

Long-term debt and hidden borrowing

Bar-Isaac, Heski; Cuñat, Alejandro - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2005

We consider borrowers with the opportunity to raise funds from a competitive banking sector that shares information, and from an alternative hidden lender. The presence of the hidden lender restricts the contracts that can be obtained from the banking sector. In equilibrium some borrowers obtain...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071410

Multitasking, limited liability and political agency

Hatfield, John William; Padro i Miquel, Gerard - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2006

This paper considers a political accountability framework in which the politician exerts unobserved e¤ort in two independent dimensions. Since the worst payo¤ to the politician is removal from o¢ ce, this contracting environment exhibits limited liability. We show that limited liability...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071456

A quantitative and qualitative test of the Allais paradox using health outcomes

Oliver, Adam - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2003

test alternative theories of risk and uncertainty in the context of health outcomes. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884553