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Does pharmaceutical price regulation affect the adoption of generic competition?: evidence from the OECD, 1999-2008

Costa-i-Font, Joan; Varol, Nebibe; McGuire, Alistair - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2011

Generic competition in the pharmaceutical market is an effective cost-containment mechanism that improves static efficiency and stimulates pharmaceutical innovation. There is no prior study that has empirically analysed the relative delays in adoption of generic competition. This paper aims to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745148

Does planning regulation protect independent retailers?

Sadun, Raffaella - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2008

nature of local political control in the UK from 1993 to 2003. Since local politicians directly control planning regulation … independent retailers between 1998 and 2004 can be attributed to the perverse effect of planning regulation. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746338

Testing the "waterbed" effect in mobile telephony

Genakos, Christos; Valletti, Tommaso - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2007

This paper examines the impact of regulatory intervention to cut termination rates of calls from fixed lines to mobile phones. Under quite general conditions of competition, theory suggests that lower termination charges will result in higher prices for mobile subscribers, a phenomenon known as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071382

Strategic patenting and software innovation

Noel, Michael; Schankerman, Mark - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2006

Strategic patenting is widely believed to raise the costs of innovating, especially in industries characterised by cumulative innovation. This paper studies the effects of strategic patenting on R&D, patenting and market value in the computer software industry. We focus on two key aspects:...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010744919

Strategic patenting and software innovation

Noel, Michael; Schankerman, Mark - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746431

Outsourcing and the rise in services

Berlingieri, Giuseppe - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2013

This paper investigates the impact of outsourcing on sectoral reallocation in the U.S. over the period 1947-2007, and on the rise in services in particular. Roughly 40% of the growth of the service sector comes from professional and business services. This is an unusual industry as more than 90%...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010744978

Product market deregulation and the U.S. employment miracle

Ebell, Monique; Haefke, Christian - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2008

We consider the dynamic relationship between product market entry regulation and equilibrium unemployment. The main …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746083

Regulating financial market infrastructures

Ferrarini, Guido; Saguato, Paolo - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2014

This paper focuses on the impact of financial market infrastructures (FMIs) and of their regulation on the post … FMIs regulation. By reviewing the current move from ‘private’ markets to ‘public’ markets internationally, and with respect … supervision. - This paper is a draft chapter for a forthcoming volume, "The Oxford Handbook on Financial Regulation," edited by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011125895

Deconstructing data protection: the 'Added-value' of a right to data protection in the EU legal order

Lynskey, Orla - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2014

Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights sets out a right to data protection which sits alongside, and in addition to, the established right to privacy in the Charter. The Charter's inclusion of an independent right to data protection differentiates it from other international human...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011126170

A theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs

Faure-Grimaud, Antoine; Laffont, Jean-Jacques; … - London School of Economics (LSE) - 1998

We propose a theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs. A principal delegates part of his authority to a supervisor who can acquire soft information about an agent's productivity. If the supervisor were risk-neutral, the principal would simply make the better informed supervisor...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928775