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Levy, Gilat - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2004

decision makers who are motivated by reputation concerns tend to ‘anti-herding’, i.e., they excessively contradict public …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928812

Reputation and allocation of ownership

Halonen, Maija - London School of Economics (LSE) - 1995

We show that allocation of ownership matters even in a long-term relationship where problems of opportunism are less severe unless agents are very patient. Ownership structure is chosen to give the agents best incentives to cooperate. The optimal control structure of the static game restricts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928815

The broadening spectrum of reputation risk in organizations: banking on risk and trust relationships

Scott, Susan V.; Walsham, Geoff - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2004

Globalizing knowledge economies foster conditions that intensify the role and value of organizational reputation risk …. In a holistic, enterprise focused era reputation is a key strategic construct that can act as a boundary object linking … reputation risk. Having noted the ambivalence that surrounds ‘risk positions’, we present a re-definition of reputation risk that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010744830

IMF concern for reputation and conditional lending failure: theory and empirics

Marchesi, Silvia; Sabani, Laura - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2005

order to preserve its reputation of being a good monitor, may actually distort its lending decisions towards greater laxity … between a country and the IMF. The longer this relationship, the stronger the IMF reputation will be affected in case it …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745315

Do reputational concerns lead to reliable ratings?

Mariano, Beatriz - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2008

This paper examines to what extent reputational concerns give rating agencies incentives to reveal information. It demonstrates that, in a simple model in which a rating agency has public and private information about a project, it may ignore private information and even contradict public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745887

Self-confidence and survival

Bar-Isaac, Heski - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2001

We consider the impact of history on the survival of a monopolist selling single units in discrete time periods, whose quality is learned slowly. If the seller learns her own quality at the same rate as customers, a sufficiently bad run of luck could induce her to stop selling. When she knows...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746467

Banking on trust: managing reputation risk in financial service organizations

Scott, Susan V.; Walsham, Geoff - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2002

In this paper we introduce concepts that build a theoretical notion of reputation risk and establish the need to extend … our approach to managing such risk.. The existing literature on reputation risk has tended to be reactive and focus on … corrosive may present an occasion for creative management. We suggest that proactive reputation risk policies and practices are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746546

Strategic consultation in the presence of career concerns

Levy, Gilat - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2000

find that when agents are concerned about their reputation, consultation results in sub-optimal sharing of information …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746684

Land distribution, incentives and the choice of production techniques in Nicaragua

Bandiera, Oriana - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2002

Does the distribution of land rights affect the choice of contractible techniques? I present evidence suggesting that Nicaraguan farmers are more likely to grow effort-intensive crops on owned rather than on rented plots. I consider two theoretical arguments that illustrate why property rights...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928686

Anti-evasion auditing policy in the presence of common income shocks

Sanchez-Villalba, Miguel - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2006

When fairly homogeneous taxpayers are affected by common income shocks, a tax agency’s optimal auditing strategy consists of auditing a low-income declarer with a probability that (weakly) increases with the other taxpayers’ declarations. Such policy generates a coordination game among...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928739