Similar Search Results

Broad cross-license agreements and persuasive patent litigation: theory and evidence from the semiconductor industry

Galasso, Alberto - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2007

-licensing that firms face to protect their intellectual property. I present a model of bargaining with learning in which firms … addition, the bargaining game shows how firms with intermediate values of asset specificity tend to engage in inefficient …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746461

Does competition solve the hold-up problem?

Felli, Leonardo; Roberts, Kevin - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2001

In an environment in which both buyers and sellers can undertake match specific investments, the presence of market competition for matches may solve hold-up and coordination problems generated by the absence of complete contingent contracts. In particular, this paper shows that when matching is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928710

Firm-specific training

Felli, Leonardo; Harris, Christopher - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2006

This paper introduces two complementary models of firm-specific training: an informational model and a productivity-enhancement model. In both models, market provision of firm-specific training is inefficient. However, the nature of the inefficiency depends on the balance between the two key...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928723

Information costs, networks and intermediation in international trade

Petropoulou, Dimitra - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2008

This paper presents a pairwise matching model with two-sided information asymmetry to analyse the impact of information costs on endogenous network building and matching by information intermediaries. The framework innovates by examining the role of information costs on incentives for trade...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745054

Competing for contacts: network competition, trade intermediation and fragmented duopoly

Petropoulou, Dimitra - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2008

A two-sided, pair-wise matching model is developed to analyse the strategic interaction between two information intermediaries who compete in commission rates and network size, giving rise to a fragmented duopoly market structure. The model suggests that network competition between information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746133

The art of brevity

Alonso, Ricardo; Rantakari, Heikki - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2014

We analyze a class of sender-receiver games with quadratic payoffs, which includes the communication games in Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2008) and Rantakari (2008) as special cases, for which the receiver's maximum expected payoff when players have access to arbitrary, mediated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011126096

Peering into the mist: social learning over an opaque observation network

Barrdear, John - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2014

I present a model of social learning over an exogenous, directed network that may be readily nested within broader macroeconomic models with dispersed information and combines the attributes that agents (a) act repeatedly and simultaneously; (b) are Bayes-rational; and (c) have strategic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011126293

The property-rights theory of the firm with endogenous timing of asset purchase

de Meza, David; Lockwood, Ben - London School of Economics (LSE) - 1998

The standard property-rights theory of the firm assumes that prior to investing in human capital, team members meet and negotiate asset ownership. This paper endogenizes the event sequence in a matching model of market equilibrium. Equilibria exist in which, for strategic and efficiency reasons,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884491

Collective bargaining under complete information

Diaz-Moreno, Carlos; Galdon-Sanchez, Jose E. - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2000

In this paper, we build and structurally estimate a complete information bargaining model of collective negotiation for … bargaining environment better than the one provided by private information models. The specification of the model with players … having different discount factors allows us to measure their relative bargaining power, a recurrent question in the theory of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884535

Government corruption and legislative procedures: is one chamber better than two?

Testa, Cecilia - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2003

This paper studies the impact of the competition between lobbies and voters on policy outcomes under alternative legislative procedures. Lobbies and citizens have opposing interests in a public policy and offer money and votes, respectively, to legislators to obtain their preferred policy....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928625