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Corporate ownership structure and performance in Europe

Grant, Jeremy; Kirchmaier, Thomas - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2004

In this paper, we show that ownership structures vary considerably across Europe, and that the dominant form of ownership is not necessarily the most efficient one. These findings are in contradiction to similar research based on US samples. The results also demonstrate that firms without a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884735

Performance persistence of pension fund managers

Tonks, Ian - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2002

This paper examines persistence over time in the performance of fund managers responsible for making the investment decisions of UK pension funds. Previous work on UK pension funds found little evidence of fund manager persistence, but we argue that this may have been due to survivorship bias in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746505

Regulating financial market infrastructures

Ferrarini, Guido; Saguato, Paolo - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2014

This paper focuses on the impact of financial market infrastructures (FMIs) and of their regulation on the post … FMIs regulation. By reviewing the current move from ‘private’ markets to ‘public’ markets internationally, and with respect … supervision. - This paper is a draft chapter for a forthcoming volume, "The Oxford Handbook on Financial Regulation," edited by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011125895

Evolution of decision and control rights in venture capital contracts: an empirical analysis

Bienz, Carsten; Walz, Uwe - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2006

We analyze the structure and evolution of the allocation of decision and control rights in venture capital contracts by using a sample of 464 contracts between venture capitalists (VC) and portfolio firms from Germany. We focus on the evolution of control and decisions rights along three time...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745436

What do we know about China's CEO's?: evidence from across the whole economy

Bryson, Alex; Zhou, Minghai - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2012

All that we know about the CEO labour market in China comes from studies of public listed companies and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This paper is the first to examine the operation of the CEO labour market across all sectors of the Chinese economy. We do so using World Bank enterprise data...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745536

The dynamics of venture capital contracts

Bienz, Carsten; Hirsch, Julia - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2005

We analyze the degree of contract completeness with respect to staging of venture capital investments using a hand-collected German data set of contract data from 464 rounds into 290 entrepreneurial firms. We distinguish three forms of staging (pure milestone financing, pure round financing and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746202

The effect of monitoring on CEO pay practices in a matching equilibrium

Chaigneau, Pierre; Sahuguet, Nicolas - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2013

We present a model of efficient contracting with endogenous matching and limited monitoring in which firms compete for CEOs. The model explains the association between limited monitoring and CEO pay practices such as pay-for-luck, high salaries, a low pay-performance sensitivity, and a more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746551

Strong managers, weak boards?

Adams, Renee B.; Ferreira, Daniel - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2009

Many governance reform proposals are based on the view that boards have been too friendly to executives, for example, by awarding them excessive pay. Although boards are often on friendly terms with executives, it is less clear that they have systematically failed to function in the interests of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011126080

The ownership of ratings

Faure-Grimaud, Antoine; Peyrache, Eloic; Quesada, Lucia - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2007

A prevalent feature in rating markets is the possibility for the client to hide the outcome of the rating process, after learning that outcome. This paper identifies the optimal contracting arrangement and the circumstances under which simple ownership contracts over ratings implement this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071353

Agency conflicts, ownership concentration, and legal shareholder protection

Burkart, Mike; Panunzi, Fausto - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2001

This paper analyzes the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial incentives, and outside ownership concentration. Legal protection a¤ects both the expropriation of shareholders and the blockholder's incentives to monitor. Because of this latter e¤ect and its repercussion on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071555