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Heterogeneous mark-ups, growth and endogenous misallocation

Peters, Michael - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2013

The recent work on misallocation argues that aggregate productivity in poor countries is low because various market frictions prevent marginal products from being equalized. By focusing on such allocative inefficiencies, misallocation is construed as a purely static phenomenon. This paper argues...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884565

Self-confidence and survival

Bar-Isaac, Heski - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2001

We consider the impact of history on the survival of a monopolist selling single units in discrete time periods, whose quality is learned slowly. If the seller learns her own quality at the same rate as customers, a sufficiently bad run of luck could induce her to stop selling. When she knows...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746467

Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover

Anderson, Ronald W.; Bustamante, Maria Cecilia; … - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2012

We study the relation between firm growth and managerial incentive provision under moral hazard when a long-lived firm is operated by a sequence of managers. In our model, firms replace their managers not only upon poor performance to provide incentives, but also when outside managers are at a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745265

Evolution of decision and control rights in venture capital contracts: an empirical analysis

Bienz, Carsten; Walz, Uwe - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2006

We analyze the structure and evolution of the allocation of decision and control rights in venture capital contracts by … using a sample of 464 contracts between venture capitalists (VC) and portfolio firms from Germany. We focus on the evolution … duration of the contract and the actual duration of the relationship. We show that contracts are not static but that control …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745436

The dynamics of venture capital contracts

Bienz, Carsten; Hirsch, Julia - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2005

predictability of the development process. To be more precise, parties choose the more complete contracts the lower the entrepreneur …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746202

The effect of monitoring on CEO pay practices in a matching equilibrium

Chaigneau, Pierre; Sahuguet, Nicolas - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2013

compensation contracts. The model thus responds to some fundamental arguments of the managerial power perspective. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746551

Moral hazard and renegotiation of multi-signal contracts

Bijapur, Mohan - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2011

We study the costs and benefits of additional information in agency contracts, when there is the possibility of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011126387

Optimal contracting and the organization of knowledge

Fuchs, William; Garicano, Luis; Rayo, Luis - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2014

output and compensate producers via incentive contracts. This simple characterization of the optimal ex-ante arrangement …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011126635

Long-term debt and hidden borrowing

Bar-Isaac, Heski; Cuñat, Alejandro - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2005

, and from an alternative hidden lender. The presence of the hidden lender restricts the contracts that can be obtained from …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071410

Multitasking, limited liability and political agency

Hatfield, John William; Padro i Miquel, Gerard - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2006

This paper considers a political accountability framework in which the politician exerts unobserved e¤ort in two independent dimensions. Since the worst payo¤ to the politician is removal from o¢ ce, this contracting environment exhibits limited liability. We show that limited liability...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071456