An order flow model, where the coded identity of the counterparties of every trade is known, hence providing institution level order flow, is applied to both stable and crisis periods in a large and liquid overnight repo market in an emerging market economy. Institution level order flow is much...

Allowing for a richer information structure than usual, we show that rational traders’ calculation with short-term price fluctuations may heavily influence their behaviour even if the interim price is not influenced by non-rational agents i.e. there is no noise trader risk. Instead, traders...

This paper studies a dynamic model of crises with timing frictions that combines the main aspects of Morris and Shin (1998) and Frankel and Pauzner (2000). The usual arguments for existence and uniqueness of equilibrium cannot be applied. It is shown that the model has a unique equilibrium...

This paper shows that, with (partial) irreversibility, higher uncertainty reduces the impact effect of demand shocks on investment. Uncertainty increases real option values making firms more cautious when investing or disinvesting. This is confirmed both numerically for a model with a rich mix...

Uncertainty appears to vary strongly over time, temporarily rising by up to 200% around major shocks like the Cuban Missile crisis, the assassination of JFK and 9/11. This paper offers the first structural framework to analyze uncertainty shocks. I build a model with a time varying second...

It is often argued that asset prices exhibit patterns incompatible with the behaviour of rational, optimizing agents. This paper proposes a rational framework which generates asset prices which appear irrational. This is accomplished by studying rational expectations equilibria in the presence...

This paper analyzes the dynamic incentives for technology adoption under a transferable permits system, which allows for strategic trading on the permit market. Initially, firms can invest both in low-emitting production technologies and trade permits. In the model, technology adoption and...

We view a contract as a list of outcomes. Ex ante, the parties commit not to consider outcomes not on the list, i.e., these are "ruled out". Ex post, they freely bargain over outcomes on the list, i.e., the contract specifies no mechanism to structure their choice; in this sense outcomes on the...