Showing 1 - 10 of 10
A sender can influence the behavior of a receiver by controlling the informativeness of a public signal. We show that the sender cannot benefit from becoming an expert, that is, from privately learning some information about the state. We then show that in some instances an uninformed sender is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011126502
We study contractual arrangements that support an efficient use of time in a knowledge-intensive economy in which agents endogenously specialize in either production or consulting. The resulting market for advice is plagued by informational problems, since both the difficulty of the questions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011126635
decision makers who are motivated by reputation concerns tend to ‘anti-herding’, i.e., they excessively contradict public … inefficient anti-herding behavior by the decision maker. …In this paper I analyze how careerist decision makers aggregate and use information provided by others. I find that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928812
We show that allocation of ownership matters even in a long-term relationship where problems of opportunism are less severe unless agents are very patient. Ownership structure is chosen to give the agents best incentives to cooperate. The optimal control structure of the static game restricts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928815
Globalizing knowledge economies foster conditions that intensify the role and value of organizational reputation risk …. In a holistic, enterprise focused era reputation is a key strategic construct that can act as a boundary object linking … reputation risk. Having noted the ambivalence that surrounds ‘risk positions’, we present a re-definition of reputation risk that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010744830
order to preserve its reputation of being a good monitor, may actually distort its lending decisions towards greater laxity … between a country and the IMF. The longer this relationship, the stronger the IMF reputation will be affected in case it …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745315
This paper examines to what extent reputational concerns give rating agencies incentives to reveal information. It demonstrates that, in a simple model in which a rating agency has public and private information about a project, it may ignore private information and even contradict public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745887
We consider the impact of history on the survival of a monopolist selling single units in discrete time periods, whose quality is learned slowly. If the seller learns her own quality at the same rate as customers, a sufficiently bad run of luck could induce her to stop selling. When she knows...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746467
In this paper we introduce concepts that build a theoretical notion of reputation risk and establish the need to extend … our approach to managing such risk.. The existing literature on reputation risk has tended to be reactive and focus on … corrosive may present an occasion for creative management. We suggest that proactive reputation risk policies and practices are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746546
In this paper I analyse the strategic interaction of decision makers and their advisers in a consultation process. I … find that when agents are concerned about their reputation, consultation results in sub-optimal sharing of information …; some decision makers may deliberately act unilaterally and not consult even when advice is costless. When they do consult …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746684