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Corporate ownership structure and performance in Europe

Grant, Jeremy; Kirchmaier, Thomas - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2004

to performance. For the first time we employ a Hodrick-Prescott Filter, a methodology widely used in macroeconomics to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884735

What do we know about China's CEO's?: evidence from across the whole economy

Bryson, Alex; Zhou, Minghai - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2012

throughout the economy and include contracts linking CEO pay directly to firm performance, annual bonus schemes, the posting of … performance bonds, and holding company stock. These incentive mechanisms appear to complement rather than substitute for one … another. The elasticity of pay with respect to company performance is one or more in two-fifths of the cases where CEO's have …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745536

Managerial ownership and firm performance in German small and medium-sized enterprises

Mueller, Elisabeth; Spitz, Alexandra - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2002

This paper studies the effect of managerial ownership on performance and the determinants of managerial ownership for … for the years 1997-2000. Managerial ownership up to around 80 per cent has a positive impact on firm performance … (incentive effect); for higher shares the effect becomes negative (entrenchment effect). Moreover, risk-aversion of managers and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745787

Corporate R&D and productivity in Germany and the United Kingdom

Bond, Stephen; Harhoff, Dietmar; Van Reenen, John - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2003

This paper analyzes differences in R&D spending and in the impact of R&D on productivity between German and UK firms. We confirm that German firms spend significantly larger amounts on R&D than their UK counterparts, even after controlling for firm size and industry effects. Using a dynamic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745353

The dark side of 'good' corporate governance: compliance-fuelled book-cooking activities

Kirchmaier, Thomas; Selvaggi, Mariano - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2006

We argue on theoretical grounds that obligatory compliance with stricter financial reporting rules (e.g. the US Sabanes-Oxley Act) may entail important unintended consequences. Paradoxically, the amount of misreporting may increase because corporate boards spend more valuable resources...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745362

Evolution of decision and control rights in venture capital contracts: an empirical analysis

Bienz, Carsten; Walz, Uwe - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2006

We analyze the structure and evolution of the allocation of decision and control rights in venture capital contracts by using a sample of 464 contracts between venture capitalists (VC) and portfolio firms from Germany. We focus on the evolution of control and decisions rights along three time...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745436

Large powerful shareholders and cash holding

Anderson, Ronald W.; Hamadi, Malika - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2009

that these cross holdings facilitate an effective internal capital market. We find little evidence that managers have an …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746176

The dynamics of venture capital contracts

Bienz, Carsten; Hirsch, Julia - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2005

We analyze the degree of contract completeness with respect to staging of venture capital investments using a hand-collected German data set of contract data from 464 rounds into 290 entrepreneurial firms. We distinguish three forms of staging (pure milestone financing, pure round financing and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746202

The effect of monitoring on CEO pay practices in a matching equilibrium

Chaigneau, Pierre; Sahuguet, Nicolas - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2013

salaries, a low pay-performance sensitivity, and a more asymmetric pay-for-performance relation. The results are driven by the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746551

Strong managers, weak boards?

Adams, Renee B.; Ferreira, Daniel - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2009

Many governance reform proposals are based on the view that boards have been too friendly to executives, for example, by awarding them excessive pay. Although boards are often on friendly terms with executives, it is less clear that they have systematically failed to function in the interests of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011126080