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The broadening spectrum of reputation risk in organizations: banking on risk and trust relationships

Scott, Susan V.; Walsham, Geoff - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2004

an analysis of recent literatures on risk, trust and reputation that links it to broader developments in society. …Globalizing knowledge economies foster conditions that intensify the role and value of organizational reputation risk …. In a holistic, enterprise focused era reputation is a key strategic construct that can act as a boundary object linking …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010744830

Banking on trust: managing reputation risk in financial service organizations

Scott, Susan V.; Walsham, Geoff - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2002

In this paper we introduce concepts that build a theoretical notion of reputation risk and establish the need to extend … our approach to managing such risk.. The existing literature on reputation risk has tended to be reactive and focus on … immediate business threats rather than trying to understand cumulative or constituent processes surrounding trust relationships …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746546

Loan maturity and renegotiation evidence from the lending practices of large and small banks

Albertazzi, Ugo - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2007

Corporate finance theories suggest that problems of asymmetric information and moral hazard in credit markets can be addressed by choosing short-term maturities. Theories of debt renegotiation suggest that the credibility of the implicit commitment to not make concessions to insolvent borrowers,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745643

ART versus reinsurance: the disciplining effect of information insensitivity

Brandts, Silke; Laux, Christian - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2005

We provide a novel benefit of "Alternative Risk Transfer" (ART) products with parametric or index triggers. When a reinsurer has private information about his client’s risk, outside reinsurers will price their reinsurance offer less aggressively. Outsiders are subject to adverse selection as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745956

Credit rationing, wealth inequality and allocation of talent

Ghatak, Maitreesh; Morelli, Massimo; Sjostrom, Tomas - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2002

We study an economy where agents are heterogeneous in terms of observable wealth and unobservable talent. Adverse selection forces creditors to ask for collateral. We study the two-way interaction between rationing in the credit market and the wages offered in the labour market. Both pooling and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746194

Strategic liquidity supply and security design

Biais, Bruno; Mariotti, Thomas - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2003

We study how securities and trading mechanisms can be designed to optimally mitigate the adverse impact of market imperfections on liquidity. Asset owners seek to obtain liquidity by selling their claims on future cash-flows, on which they have private information. Our analysis encompasses both...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746262

Long-term debt and hidden borrowing

Bar-Isaac, Heski; Cuñat, Alejandro - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2005

We consider borrowers with the opportunity to raise funds from a competitive banking sector that shares information, and from an alternative hidden lender. The presence of the hidden lender restricts the contracts that can be obtained from the banking sector. In equilibrium some borrowers obtain...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071410

Anti-herding and strategic consultation

Levy, Gilat - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2004

decision makers who are motivated by reputation concerns tend to ‘anti-herding’, i.e., they excessively contradict public …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928812

Reputation and allocation of ownership

Halonen, Maija - London School of Economics (LSE) - 1995

We show that allocation of ownership matters even in a long-term relationship where problems of opportunism are less severe unless agents are very patient. Ownership structure is chosen to give the agents best incentives to cooperate. The optimal control structure of the static game restricts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928815

IMF concern for reputation and conditional lending failure: theory and empirics

Marchesi, Silvia; Sabani, Laura - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2005

order to preserve its reputation of being a good monitor, may actually distort its lending decisions towards greater laxity … between a country and the IMF. The longer this relationship, the stronger the IMF reputation will be affected in case it …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745315