We consider a general equilibrium Lucas (1978) economy with one consumption good and two heterogeneous Epstein-Zin investors. The output is subject to rare large drops or, more generally, can have non-lognormal distribution with higher cumulants. The heterogeneity in preferences generates excess...

We consider a noisy rational expectations equilibrium in a multi-asset economy populated by informed and uninformed investors, and noise traders. Informed investors privately observe an aggregate risk factor affecting the probabilities of different states of the economy. Uninformed investors...

The stylized fact that public announcements in financial markets are followed by intense trading, high trading volume and volatile prices, is widely perceived as the sign of increasing disagreement due to the announcement. However, it is common to argue that this would be inconsistent with...

We develop a tractable model in which trade is generated by asymmetry in agents' information sets. We show that, even if news are not generated by a stochastic volatility process, in the presence of information treatment and/or order processing costs, the (unique) equilibrium price process is...

Market liquidity is typically characterized by a number of ad hoc metrics, such as depth, volume, bid-ask spreads etc. No general coherent denition seems to exist, and few attempts have been made to justify the existing metrics on welfare grounds. In this paper we propose a welfare-based...

Market liquidity is typically characterized by a number of ad hoc metrics, such as depth (or market impact), volume, intermediation costs (such as breadth) etc. No general coherent denition seems to exist, and few attempts have been made to justify the existing metrics on welfare grounds. In...

Financial market liquidity has become increasingly fragmented across multiple trading platforms. We propose an intuitive welfare-based market quality metric that can properly aggregate local market conditions across both securities and trading venues. Our analysis rests on a general equilibrium...

Subjects who overestimate their performance in experimental tasks unrelated to travel are less willing to insure against failing in the task and also less inclined to buy travel insurance. This suggests intrinsic optimism influences insurance demand and diminishes adverse selection

This paper studies employer recruitment and selection of job applicants when productivity is match-specific. Job-seekers have private, noisy assessments of their match value and the firm performs noisy interviews. Job-seekers' willingness to undergo a costly hiring process will depend both on...

We analyse the design of decision rules by a principal who faces an informed but biased agent and who is unable to commit to contingent transfers. The contracting problem reduces to a delegation problem in which the principal commits to a set of decisions from which the agent chooses his...