We consider a general equilibrium Lucas (1978) economy with one consumption good and two heterogeneous Epstein-Zin investors. The output is subject to rare large drops or, more generally, can have non-lognormal distribution with higher cumulants. The heterogeneity in preferences generates excess...

We analyze the structure and evolution of the allocation of decision and control rights in venture capital contracts by using a sample of 464 contracts between venture capitalists (VC) and portfolio firms from Germany. We focus on the evolution of control and decisions rights along three time...

We analyze the degree of contract completeness with respect to staging of venture capital investments using a hand-collected German data set of contract data from 464 rounds into 290 entrepreneurial firms. We distinguish three forms of staging (pure milestone financing, pure round financing and...

Market liquidity is typically characterized by a number of ad hoc metrics, such as depth, volume, bid-ask spreads etc. No general coherent denition seems to exist, and few attempts have been made to justify the existing metrics on welfare grounds. In this paper we propose a welfare-based...

Market liquidity is typically characterized by a number of ad hoc metrics, such as depth (or market impact), volume, intermediation costs (such as breadth) etc. No general coherent denition seems to exist, and few attempts have been made to justify the existing metrics on welfare grounds. In...

Financial market liquidity has become increasingly fragmented across multiple trading platforms. We propose an intuitive welfare-based market quality metric that can properly aggregate local market conditions across both securities and trading venues. Our analysis rests on a general equilibrium...

Theory suggests that reputations, developed in repeated face-to-face interactions, allow nonanonymous, floor-based trading venues to attenuate adverse selection in the trading process. We identify instances when stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) experience a non-trivial...

Given the opportunity to buy IPO shares of uncertain value at a fixed price, potentially informed investors have an incentive to refuse to participate in offerings the underwriter happens to overprice. We show that an underwriter can efficiently resolve this problem by entering into a repeat...

A bank can efficiently underwrite individually difficult to value IPOs by offering them as a package deal to a stable coalition of investors (block-booking). Block-booking banks set offer prices to equalize downside risk across their offerings, not expected returns. Examining US IPOs over the...

We examine the determinants of underwriter spreads on straight/fixed rate Eurobonds issued by U.S. firms between 1990 and 1998. We find that underwriter spreads are influenced by: (i) the governing law as it influences the timely and orderly renegotiation of contract terms, with bonds governed...