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Follower payoffs in symmetric duopoly games

von Stengel, Bernhard - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2010

This paper compares the leader and follower payoff in a duopoly game, as they arise in sequential play, with the Nash payoff in simultaneous play. If the game is symmetric, has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, and players' payoffs are monotonic in the opponent's choice along their own best...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010744848

Cartel stability under capacity constraints: the traditional view restored

Nocke, Volker - London School of Economics (LSE) - 1999

The existence of a negative relationship between cartel stability and the level of excess capacity in an industry has for a long time been the dominant view in the traditional IO literature. Recent supergame-theoretic contributions (e.g. Brock and Scheinkman, 1985) appear to show that this view...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745124

A general analysis of sequential merger games with an application to cross-border mergers

Salvo, Alberto - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2004

This paper seeks to uncover why the pattern of equilibria in sequential merger games of a certain type is similar across a fairly wide class of models much studied in the literature. By developing general conditions characterising each element of the set of possible equilibria, I show that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745143

Underinvestment and market structure

Nocke, Volker - London School of Economics (LSE) - 1998

This paper analyses a dynamic game of investment in R&D or advertising, where current investments change future market conditions. It investigates whether underinvestment can be supported in equilibrium by the threat of escalation in investment outlays. When there are no spillovers, or there is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745545

Noise and competition in strategic oligopoly

Dridi, Ramdan; Germain, Laurent - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2000

Focusing on homogeneous beliefs, we can distinguish two commonly shared ideas that, i) the competition between informed … market, i) the informativeness of prices increases with the degree of competition and, ii) the aggregate and individual …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071458

Does competition solve the hold-up problem?

Felli, Leonardo; Roberts, Kevin - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2001

competition for matches may solve hold-up and coordination problems generated by the absence of complete contingent contracts. In … particular, this paper shows that when matching is assortative and sellers’ investments precede market competition then … coordination failures. Different types of efficiency arise when buyers undertake investment before market competition. These …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928710

The effect of credit rationing on the shape of the competition-innovation relationship

Bena, Jan - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2009

incentive effect of competition on innovation and the effect competition has on the degree of credit rationing. I find that the … levels of competition. These predictions are supported by empirical evidence: The competition-innovation relationship has an … developed financial systems. Innovation-enhancing policies implemented through competition reforms ought to be complemented by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745834

Intrafirm trade and product contractibility

Bernard, Andrew B.; Jensen, J. Bradford; Redding, Stephen; … - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884575

The determinants of vertical integration in export processing: theory and evidence from China

Fernandes, Ana; Tang, Heiwai - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2010

property- rights theory of intra-firm trade. However, in the regime that foreign firms own the imported components, no …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071204

Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write?

Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo; Postlewaite, Andrew - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2006

We find an economic rationale for the common sense answer to the question in our title — courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. An active court can improve on the outcome...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071363