Showing 1 - 10 of 53
Using cross-sectional analysis of corporate dividend policy we show that large shareholders extract rents from firms … and expropriate minority shareholders in the weak corporate governance environment of an emerging economy. By comparing …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071083
In this paper, we show that ownership structures vary considerably across Europe, and that the dominant form of ownership is not necessarily the most efficient one. These findings are in contradiction to similar research based on US samples. The results also demonstrate that firms without a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884735
We analyze the structure and evolution of the allocation of decision and control rights in venture capital contracts by using a sample of 464 contracts between venture capitalists (VC) and portfolio firms from Germany. We focus on the evolution of control and decisions rights along three time...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745436
This paper studies the effect of managerial ownership on performance and the determinants of managerial ownership for small and medium-sized private companies. We use a panel of around 1300 firms in the German business-related service sector for the years 1997-2000. Managerial ownership up to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745787
We study the relationship between liquid asset holding and the pattern of share ownership and control structures within the firm. We explore these issues using a data set of Belgian firms that is particularly well suited to studying the institutions of control oriented finance. The data include...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746176
We analyze the degree of contract completeness with respect to staging of venture capital investments using a hand-collected German data set of contract data from 464 rounds into 290 entrepreneurial firms. We distinguish three forms of staging (pure milestone financing, pure round financing and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746202
We present a model of efficient contracting with endogenous matching and limited monitoring in which firms compete for CEOs. The model explains the association between limited monitoring and CEO pay practices such as pay-for-luck, high salaries, a low pay-performance sensitivity, and a more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746551
have systematically failed to function in the interests of shareholders. Understanding board monitoring requires a theory …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011126080
concentration. Legal protection a¤ects both the expropriation of shareholders and the blockholder's incentives to monitor. Because … large and small shareholders. In the extended framework with monetary incentives, ownership is fully dispersed when legal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071555
Banks operating under Value-at-Risk constraints give rise to a welldefined aggregate balance sheet capacity for the banking sector as a whole that depends on total bank capital. Equilibrium risk and market risk premiums can be solved in closed form as functions of aggregate bank capital. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884614