Similar Search Results

Bar-Isaac, Heski - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2001

We consider the impact of history on the survival of a monopolist selling single units in discrete time periods, whose quality is learned slowly. If the seller learns her own quality at the same rate as customers, a sufficiently bad run of luck could induce her to stop selling. When she knows...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746467

Consumer search: evidence from path-tracking data

Pinna, Fabio; Seiler, Stephan - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2014

We estimate the effect of consumer search on the price of the purchased product in a physical store environment. We … confounding factors, we estimate that an additional minute spent searching lowers price paid by $2.10 which represents 8 percent …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011126650

Follower payoffs in symmetric duopoly games

von Stengel, Bernhard - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2010

This paper compares the leader and follower payoff in a duopoly game, as they arise in sequential play, with the Nash payoff in simultaneous play. If the game is symmetric, has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, and players' payoffs are monotonic in the opponent's choice along their own best...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010744848

Cartel stability under capacity constraints: the traditional view restored

Nocke, Volker - London School of Economics (LSE) - 1999

relationship between excess capacity and the collusive price. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745124

A general analysis of sequential merger games with an application to cross-border mergers

Salvo, Alberto - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2004

This paper seeks to uncover why the pattern of equilibria in sequential merger games of a certain type is similar across a fairly wide class of models much studied in the literature. By developing general conditions characterising each element of the set of possible equilibria, I show that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745143

Underinvestment and market structure

Nocke, Volker - London School of Economics (LSE) - 1998

This paper analyses a dynamic game of investment in R&D or advertising, where current investments change future market conditions. It investigates whether underinvestment can be supported in equilibrium by the threat of escalation in investment outlays. When there are no spillovers, or there is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745545

Does competition solve the hold-up problem?

Felli, Leonardo; Roberts, Kevin - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2001

In an environment in which both buyers and sellers can undertake match specific investments, the presence of market competition for matches may solve hold-up and coordination problems generated by the absence of complete contingent contracts. In particular, this paper shows that when matching is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928710

Information costs, networks and intermediation in international trade

Petropoulou, Dimitra - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2008

This paper presents a pairwise matching model with two-sided information asymmetry to analyse the impact of information costs on endogenous network building and matching by information intermediaries. The framework innovates by examining the role of information costs on incentives for trade...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745054

Competing for contacts: network competition, trade intermediation and fragmented duopoly

Petropoulou, Dimitra - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2008

intermediaries' inability to price discriminate between the competitive and non-competitive market segments, gives rise to an …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746133

Market experimentation in a dynamic differentiated-goods duopoly

Keller, Godfrey; Rady, Sven - London School of Economics (LSE) - 1999

increases with the price differential, there is scope for active learning. In a setting with linear demand curves, we derive … price as would be set by myopic players, and there is no price dispersion. When firms value information more highly, on the … other hand, they actively learn by creating price dispersion. This market experimentation is transient, and most likely to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746441