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Contract structure, risk sharing and investment choice

Fischer, Gregory - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2011

explore this possibility, I develop a theory that unifies models of investment choice, informal risk sharing, and formal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746368

Digit ratio (2D:4D) and altruism: evidence from a large, multi-ethnic sample

Galizzi, Matteo M.; Nieboer, Jeroen - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2015

We look at the links between the Digit Ratio - the ratio of the length of the index finger to the length of the ring finger – for both right and left hands, and giving in a Dictator Game. Unlike previous studies with exclusively Caucasian subjects, we recruited a large, ethnically diverse...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011171763

Contract structure, risk sharing and investment choice

Fischer, Gregory - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2013

explore this possibility, I develop a theory that unifies models of investment choice, informal risk-sharing, and formal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011125976

The property-rights theory of the firm with endogenous timing of asset purchase

de Meza, David; Lockwood, Ben - London School of Economics (LSE) - 1998

negotiate asset ownership. This paper endogenizes the event sequence in a matching model of market equilibrium. Equilibria exist … in which, for strategic and efficiency reasons, agents invest in human capital and buy assets prior to matching and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884491

Does competition solve the hold-up problem?

Felli, Leonardo; Roberts, Kevin - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2001

particular, this paper shows that when matching is assortative and sellers’ investments precede market competition then … coordination failures. Different types of efficiency arise when buyers undertake investment before market competition. These … inefficiencies lead to buyers’ under-investment due to a hold-up problem but, when competition is at its peak, there is a unique …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928710

Qualified majority voting explained

Felsenthal, Dan S.; Machover, Moshé - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2004

We explain the issue of the decision rule of the EU's Council of Ministers. We outline, in as non-technical fashion as we can, the mathematical theory (due to L S Penrose) that addresses this sort of issue. We assess the decision rule prescribed in the Nice Treaty as well as that included in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746113

A model of political parties

Levy, Gilat - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2004

This paper presents a new model of political parties. I assume that the role of parties is to increase the commitment ability of politicians vis-à-vis the voters. Whereas a politician running alone can only offer his ideal policy, the set of policies that a party can commit to is the Pareto set...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071543

Collective bargaining under complete information

Diaz-Moreno, Carlos; Galdon-Sanchez, Jose E. - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2000

In this paper, we build and structurally estimate a complete information bargaining model of collective negotiation for Spain. For large firms, the assumption of complete information seems a sensible one, and it matches the collective bargaining environment better than the one provided by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884535

Government corruption and legislative procedures: is one chamber better than two?

Testa, Cecilia - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2003

This paper studies the impact of the competition between lobbies and voters on policy outcomes under alternative legislative procedures. Lobbies and citizens have opposing interests in a public policy and offer money and votes, respectively, to legislators to obtain their preferred policy....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928625

Firm-specific training

Felli, Leonardo; Harris, Christopher - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2006

This paper introduces two complementary models of firm-specific training: an informational model and a productivity-enhancement model. In both models, market provision of firm-specific training is inefficient. However, the nature of the inefficiency depends on the balance between the two key...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928723