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Differential merger effects: the case of the personal computer industry

Genakos, Christos D. - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2004

This paper examines how information on the purchasing patterns of different customer segments can be used to more accurately evaluate the economic impact of mergers. Using a detailed dataset for the leading manufacturers in the US during the late nineties, I evaluate the welfare effects of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928622

A general analysis of sequential merger games with an application to cross-border mergers

Salvo, Alberto - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2004

This paper seeks to uncover why the pattern of equilibria in sequential merger games of a certain type is similar across a fairly wide class of models much studied in the literature. By developing general conditions characterising each element of the set of possible equilibria, I show that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745143

Evolution of decision and control rights in venture capital contracts: an empirical analysis

Bienz, Carsten; Walz, Uwe - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2006

We analyze the structure and evolution of the allocation of decision and control rights in venture capital contracts by using a sample of 464 contracts between venture capitalists (VC) and portfolio firms from Germany. We focus on the evolution of control and decisions rights along three time...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745436

What do we know about China's CEO's?: evidence from across the whole economy

Bryson, Alex; Zhou, Minghai - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2012

All that we know about the CEO labour market in China comes from studies of public listed companies and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This paper is the first to examine the operation of the CEO labour market across all sectors of the Chinese economy. We do so using World Bank enterprise data...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745536

What do internal capital markets do?: redistribution vs. incentives

Gautier, Axel; Heider, Florian - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2001

In this paper we explain the apparent diversification discount of conglomerates without assuming inefficent-cross subsidisation through internal capital markets. Instead we assume that an internal capital market efficiently redistributes scare resources across a conglomerates divisions between...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745870

The dynamics of venture capital contracts

Bienz, Carsten; Hirsch, Julia - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2005

We analyze the degree of contract completeness with respect to staging of venture capital investments using a hand-collected German data set of contract data from 464 rounds into 290 entrepreneurial firms. We distinguish three forms of staging (pure milestone financing, pure round financing and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746202

Innovation in business groups

Belenzon, Sharon; Berkovitz, Tomer - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2007

Using novel data on European firms, this paper examines the effect of business group affiliation on innovation. We find that business groups foster the scale and novelty of corporate innovation. Group affiliation is particularly important in industries that rely more on external finance and have...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746363

The effect of monitoring on CEO pay practices in a matching equilibrium

Chaigneau, Pierre; Sahuguet, Nicolas - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2013

We present a model of efficient contracting with endogenous matching and limited monitoring in which firms compete for CEOs. The model explains the association between limited monitoring and CEO pay practices such as pay-for-luck, high salaries, a low pay-performance sensitivity, and a more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746551

Minority blocks and takeover premia

Burkart, Mike; Gromb, Denis; Panunzi, Fausto - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2005

can only decide to tender or retain their shares. As private benefit extraction is inefficient, the post-takeover share … value increases with the bidder’s shareholdings. In a successful takeover, the blockholder tenders all his shares and the … small shareholders tender the amount needed such that the post-takeover share value matches the bid price. Compared to a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746720

Say pays! Shareholder voice and firm performance

Cuñat, Vicente; Giné, Mireia; Guadalupe, Maria - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2013

This paper estimates the effects of Say-on-Pay (SoP); a policy that increases shareholder "voice" by providing shareholders with a regular vote on executive pay. We apply a regression discontinuity design to the votes on shareholder-sponsored SoP proposals. Adopting SoP leads to large increases...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071266