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Student satisfaction, league tables and University applications
Gibbons, Stephen; Neumayer, Eric; Perkins, Richard - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2013
We investigate the impact of information about student satisfaction on university choice, using data from the UK’s National Student Survey (NSS) and on applications to undergraduate degree courses. We show that the NSS has a small, statistically significant effect on applications at the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011126173
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Land markets and land market regulation : progress towards understanding
Cheshire, P. C.; Sheppard, Stephen Charles - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2004
We introduce the papers in this volume and put them into the context of the literature on land use regulation. We then … synthesise and draw some conclusions from existing research on land use regulation and interpret the evidence currently available … use regulation is, compared to regulation in other contexts, significantly neglected. We hope that this special issue …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745368
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Law enforcement under incomplete law: theory and evidence from financial market regulation
Pistor, Katharina; Xu, Cheng-Gang - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2002
from the history of financial market regulation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746149
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Does planning regulation protect independent retailers?
Sadun, Raffaella - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2008
nature of local political control in the UK from 1993 to 2003. Since local politicians directly control planning regulation … independent retailers between 1998 and 2004 can be attributed to the perverse effect of planning regulation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746338
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The lifecycle of the financial sector and other speculative industries
Biais, Bruno; Rochet, Jean-Charles; Woolley, Paul - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2009
Speculative industries exploit novel technologies subject to two risks. First, there is uncertainty about the fundamental value of the innovation: is it strong or fragile? Second, it is difficult to monitor managers, which creates moral hazard. Because of moral hazard, managers earn agency rents...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010744809
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Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover
Anderson, Ronald W.; Bustamante, Maria Cecilia; … - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2012
We study the relation between firm growth and managerial incentive provision under moral hazard when a long-lived firm is operated by a sequence of managers. In our model, firms replace their managers not only upon poor performance to provide incentives, but also when outside managers are at a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745265
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Central banks and financial crises
Buiter, Willem H. - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2008
The paper draws lessons from the experience of the past year for the conduct of central banks in the pursuit of macroeconomic and financial stability. Macroeconomic stability is defined as either price stability or as price stability and sustainable output or employment growth. Financial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745389
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Loan maturity and renegotiation evidence from the lending practices of large and small banks
Albertazzi, Ugo - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2007
Corporate finance theories suggest that problems of asymmetric information and moral hazard in credit markets can be addressed by choosing short-term maturities. Theories of debt renegotiation suggest that the credibility of the implicit commitment to not make concessions to insolvent borrowers,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745643
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Choice of corporate risk management tools under moral hazard
Bena, Jan - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2006
This paper examines the choice of tools for managing a firm’s operational risks: cash reserves, insurance contracts, and financial assets under an optimal financing contract that solves moral hazard between insiders and outside investors. Risk management is valuable as it reduces the costs of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745872
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Enforcement-proof contracts with moral hazard in precaution: ensuring ‘permanence’ in carbon sequestration
MacKenzie, Ian A.; Ohndorf, Markus; Palmer, Charles - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2010
Opportunistic behaviour due to incomplete contract enforcement is a risk in many economic transactions such as forest carbon sequestration contracts. In this paper, an enforcement-proof incentive contract is developed in which a buyer demands a guaranteed delivery of a good or service given a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745900