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Regulating financial market infrastructures
Ferrarini, Guido; Saguato, Paolo - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2014
This paper focuses on the impact of financial market infrastructures (FMIs) and of their regulation on the post … FMIs, and focuses on the dichotomy between the ‘systemic risk’ and ‘transaction costs’ approaches to financial markets and … FMIs regulation. By reviewing the current move from ‘private’ markets to ‘public’ markets internationally, and with respect …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011125895
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Corporate ownership structure and performance in Europe
Grant, Jeremy; Kirchmaier, Thomas - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2004
In this paper, we show that ownership structures vary considerably across Europe, and that the dominant form of ownership is not necessarily the most efficient one. These findings are in contradiction to similar research based on US samples. The results also demonstrate that firms without a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884735
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Evolution of decision and control rights in venture capital contracts: an empirical analysis
Bienz, Carsten; Walz, Uwe - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2006
We analyze the structure and evolution of the allocation of decision and control rights in venture capital contracts by using a sample of 464 contracts between venture capitalists (VC) and portfolio firms from Germany. We focus on the evolution of control and decisions rights along three time...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745436
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What do we know about China's CEO's?: evidence from across the whole economy
Bryson, Alex; Zhou, Minghai - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2012
economy. We do so using World Bank enterprise data for the first part of the 21st Century. Incentive schemes are commonplace …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745536
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The dynamics of venture capital contracts
Bienz, Carsten; Hirsch, Julia - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2005
We analyze the degree of contract completeness with respect to staging of venture capital investments using a hand-collected German data set of contract data from 464 rounds into 290 entrepreneurial firms. We distinguish three forms of staging (pure milestone financing, pure round financing and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746202
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The effect of monitoring on CEO pay practices in a matching equilibrium
Chaigneau, Pierre; Sahuguet, Nicolas - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2013
We present a model of efficient contracting with endogenous matching and limited monitoring in which firms compete for CEOs. The model explains the association between limited monitoring and CEO pay practices such as pay-for-luck, high salaries, a low pay-performance sensitivity, and a more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746551
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Strong managers, weak boards?
Adams, Renee B.; Ferreira, Daniel - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2009
Many governance reform proposals are based on the view that boards have been too friendly to executives, for example, by awarding them excessive pay. Although boards are often on friendly terms with executives, it is less clear that they have systematically failed to function in the interests of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011126080
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The ownership of ratings
Faure-Grimaud, Antoine; Peyrache, Eloic; Quesada, Lucia - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2007
A prevalent feature in rating markets is the possibility for the client to hide the outcome of the rating process, after learning that outcome. This paper identifies the optimal contracting arrangement and the circumstances under which simple ownership contracts over ratings implement this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071353
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Agency conflicts, ownership concentration, and legal shareholder protection
Burkart, Mike; Panunzi, Fausto - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2001
This paper analyzes the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial incentives, and outside ownership concentration. Legal protection a¤ects both the expropriation of shareholders and the blockholder's incentives to monitor. Because of this latter e¤ect and its repercussion on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071555
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Reforming securities and derivatives trading in the EU: from EMIR to MiFIR
Ferrarini, Guido; Saguato, Paolo - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2013
The financial crisis has generated a deep revision of the regulation of securities and derivatives markets. In this … paper, we critically examine the extent to which current reforms, such as the European Market Infrastructure Regulation and … the proposed new Markets in Financial Instruments Directive and Regulation, will expand "public" securities and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011126127