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What do we know about China's CEO's?: evidence from across the whole economy

Bryson, Alex; Zhou, Minghai - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2012

All that we know about the CEO labour market in China comes from studies of public listed companies and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This paper is the first to examine the operation of the CEO labour market across all sectors of the Chinese economy. We do so using World Bank enterprise data...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745536

Managerial ownership and firm performance in German small and medium-sized enterprises

Mueller, Elisabeth; Spitz, Alexandra - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2002

This paper studies the effect of managerial ownership on performance and the determinants of managerial ownership for small and medium-sized private companies. We use a panel of around 1300 firms in the German business-related service sector for the years 1997-2000. Managerial ownership up to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745787

Corporate ownership structure and performance in Europe

Grant, Jeremy; Kirchmaier, Thomas - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2004

In this paper, we show that ownership structures vary considerably across Europe, and that the dominant form of ownership is not necessarily the most efficient one. These findings are in contradiction to similar research based on US samples. The results also demonstrate that firms without a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884735

Corporate R&D and productivity in Germany and the United Kingdom

Bond, Stephen; Harhoff, Dietmar; Van Reenen, John - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2003

This paper analyzes differences in R&D spending and in the impact of R&D on productivity between German and UK firms. We confirm that German firms spend significantly larger amounts on R&D than their UK counterparts, even after controlling for firm size and industry effects. Using a dynamic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745353

The dark side of 'good' corporate governance: compliance-fuelled book-cooking activities

Kirchmaier, Thomas; Selvaggi, Mariano - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2006

-looking strategy setting, As these surveillance devices are substitute methods of gauging management quality, when boards focus on the … firm's internal control and accounting system they become semi-detached from strategy - their business acumen falters. Top … review carries more weight in the board's decision-making process, the return to managerial book-cooking (a purely influence …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745362

Evolution of decision and control rights in venture capital contracts: an empirical analysis

Bienz, Carsten; Walz, Uwe - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2006

We analyze the structure and evolution of the allocation of decision and control rights in venture capital contracts by using a sample of 464 contracts between venture capitalists (VC) and portfolio firms from Germany. We focus on the evolution of control and decisions rights along three time...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745436

Large powerful shareholders and cash holding

Anderson, Ronald W.; Hamadi, Malika - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2009

We study the relationship between liquid asset holding and the pattern of share ownership and control structures within the firm. We explore these issues using a data set of Belgian firms that is particularly well suited to studying the institutions of control oriented finance. The data include...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746176

The dynamics of venture capital contracts

Bienz, Carsten; Hirsch, Julia - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2005

We analyze the degree of contract completeness with respect to staging of venture capital investments using a hand-collected German data set of contract data from 464 rounds into 290 entrepreneurial firms. We distinguish three forms of staging (pure milestone financing, pure round financing and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746202

The effect of monitoring on CEO pay practices in a matching equilibrium

Chaigneau, Pierre; Sahuguet, Nicolas - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2013

We present a model of efficient contracting with endogenous matching and limited monitoring in which firms compete for CEOs. The model explains the association between limited monitoring and CEO pay practices such as pay-for-luck, high salaries, a low pay-performance sensitivity, and a more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746551

Strong managers, weak boards?

Adams, Renee B.; Ferreira, Daniel - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2009

have systematically failed to function in the interests of shareholders. Understanding board monitoring requires a theory … share private information with an independent board of directors. To encourage the CEO to communicate, the board may … that the existing cross-section evidence on the correlation between board composition and CEO ownership and tenure needs re …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011126080