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Anderlini, Luca (contributor); Felli, Leonardo (contributor) - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003384936

Contractual relations between European VC-funds and investors : the impact of repuation and bargaining power on contractual design

Schmidt, Daniel (contributor); Wahrenburg, Mark (contributor) - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002144687

Are Public Sector CEOs Different?Leadership Wages and Performance in Schools

Besley, Timothy; Machin, Stephen - London School of Economics and Political Science - 2008

This paper uses a unique data set to investigate the link betweenthe pay and performance of school principals. It is frequently arguedthat public sector CEOs are paid like bureaucrats with little rewardfor good performance. However, this ignores the possibility of implicitlabor market...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009138499

Accountability and incentives: The impacts of dierent regimes on hospitalwaiting times in England and Wales

Besley, Timothy; Bevan, Gwyn; Burchardi, Konrad - London School of Economics and Political Science - 2008

Improving accountability in public services has been a central ob-jective of many public sector reforms in recent years. Chief amongthese have been efforts to generate observable performance measuresas a basis for monitoring performance. This paper examines a nat-ural experiment in regimes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009138500

Contract Duration and Investment Incentives: Evidence from Land Tenancy Agreements

Bandiera, Oriana - London School of Economics and Political Science - 2005

This paper analyses the empirical determinants of contract length, a key andyet neglected dimension of contractual … structure. I estimate contract length andcontract type jointly using original data on tenancy agreements signed between1870 and … 1880 in the district of Siracusa, Italy.The findings indicate that the choice of contract length is driven by theneed to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005870994

Contractual Structure and Endogenous Matching in Partnerships

Ghatak, Maitreesh; Karajvanov, Alexander K. - London School of Economics and Political Science; Simon … - 2011

We analyze optimal contracts and optimal matching patterns in a simple model of partnershipwhere there is a double-sided moral hazard problem and potential partners differ intheir productivity in two tasks. It is possible for one individual to accomplish both tasks (soleproduction) and there are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008860709

Repayment Frequency in Micro nance Contracts with Present-Biased Borrowers

Fischer, Greg; Ghatak, Maitreesh - London School of Economics and Political Science - 2010

This paper analyzes the theoretical underpinnings of high-frequency repayment, a featurein nearly all microfinance contracts that has been largely overlooked by theorists. The pervasive belief among practitioners that frequent repayment is critical in achieving high repaymentrates is puzzling....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008860716

Public-Private Partnerships for the Provision of Public Goods: Theory and an Application to NGOs

Besley, Timothy; Ghatak, Maitreesh - London School of Economics and Political Science - 1999

This paper analyzes the role of public and private responsibility in the provision of publicgoods. We emphasize that a typical public good will require many different inputs whichraises the possibility of partnerships to exploit comparative advantages of different parties.But hold-up problems...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008860718

On Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect

Gangopadhyay, Shubhashis; Ghatak, Maitreesh; Lensink, Robert - India Development Foundation; London School of …; … - 2005

We show that the joint liability lending contracts derived in Ghatak (2000) violate an ex post incentive-compatibility constraint which says the amount of joint liability cannot exceed the amount of individual liability. We derive and characterize optimal separating joint liability contracts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008911469