Similar Search Results

Anderlini, Luca (contributor); Felli, Leonardo (contributor) - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003384936

Contractual relations between European VC-funds and investors : the impact of repuation and bargaining power on contractual design

Schmidt, Daniel (contributor); Wahrenburg, Mark (contributor) - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002144687

Contract Duration and Investment Incentives: Evidence from Land Tenancy Agreements

Bandiera, Oriana - London School of Economics and Political Science - 2005

This paper analyses the empirical determinants of contract length, a key andyet neglected dimension of contractual … structure. I estimate contract length andcontract type jointly using original data on tenancy agreements signed between1870 and … 1880 in the district of Siracusa, Italy.The findings indicate that the choice of contract length is driven by theneed to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005870994

Contractual Structure and Endogenous Matching in Partnerships

Ghatak, Maitreesh; Karajvanov, Alexander K. - London School of Economics and Political Science; Simon … - 2011

We analyze optimal contracts and optimal matching patterns in a simple model of partnershipwhere there is a double-sided moral hazard problem and potential partners differ intheir productivity in two tasks. It is possible for one individual to accomplish both tasks (soleproduction) and there are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008860709

Repayment Frequency in Micro nance Contracts with Present-Biased Borrowers

Fischer, Greg; Ghatak, Maitreesh - London School of Economics and Political Science - 2010

This paper analyzes the theoretical underpinnings of high-frequency repayment, a featurein nearly all microfinance contracts that has been largely overlooked by theorists. The pervasive belief among practitioners that frequent repayment is critical in achieving high repaymentrates is puzzling....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008860716

Public-Private Partnerships for the Provision of Public Goods: Theory and an Application to NGOs

Besley, Timothy; Ghatak, Maitreesh - London School of Economics and Political Science - 1999

This paper analyzes the role of public and private responsibility in the provision of publicgoods. We emphasize that a typical public good will require many different inputs whichraises the possibility of partnerships to exploit comparative advantages of different parties.But hold-up problems...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008860718

On Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect

Gangopadhyay, Shubhashis; Ghatak, Maitreesh; Lensink, Robert - India Development Foundation; London School of …; … - 2005

We show that the joint liability lending contracts derived in Ghatak (2000) violate an ex post incentive-compatibility constraint which says the amount of joint liability cannot exceed the amount of individual liability. We derive and characterize optimal separating joint liability contracts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008911469