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Garicano, Luis - London School of Economics and Political Science - 2010

Large companies are usually organized into business units, yet some activitiesare almost always centralized in a company-wide functional unit. We firstshow that organizations endogenously create an incentive conflict between functionalmanagers (who desire excessive standardization) and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008860684

Active courts and menu contracts

Anderlini, Luca (contributor); Felli, Leonardo (contributor) - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003384936

Social Incentives in the Workplace

Bandiera, Oriana; Barankay, Iwan; Rasul, Imran - London School of Economics and Political Science - 2009

We present evidence on social incentives in the workplace, namely on whether workers’ behavioris affected by the presence of those they are socially tied to, even in settings where thereare no externalities among workers due to either the production technology or the compensationscheme in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005870960

Negotiating on water : concern for fairness and incentives within a non-cooperative bargaining framework

Marchiori, Carmen (contributor) - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003313744

Broad cross-license agreements and persuasive patent litigation : theory and evidence from the semiconductor industry

Galasso, Alberto (contributor) - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003525252

Contractual relations between European VC-funds and investors : the impact of repuation and bargaining power on contractual design

Schmidt, Daniel (contributor); Wahrenburg, Mark (contributor) - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002144687

Contract Duration and Investment Incentives: Evidence from Land Tenancy Agreements

Bandiera, Oriana - London School of Economics and Political Science - 2005

This paper analyses the empirical determinants of contract length, a key andyet neglected dimension of contractual … structure. I estimate contract length andcontract type jointly using original data on tenancy agreements signed between1870 and … 1880 in the district of Siracusa, Italy.The findings indicate that the choice of contract length is driven by theneed to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005870994

Contractual Structure and Endogenous Matching in Partnerships

Ghatak, Maitreesh; Karajvanov, Alexander K. - London School of Economics and Political Science; Simon … - 2011

We analyze optimal contracts and optimal matching patterns in a simple model of partnershipwhere there is a double-sided moral hazard problem and potential partners differ intheir productivity in two tasks. It is possible for one individual to accomplish both tasks (soleproduction) and there are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008860709

Repayment Frequency in Micro nance Contracts with Present-Biased Borrowers

Fischer, Greg; Ghatak, Maitreesh - London School of Economics and Political Science - 2010

This paper analyzes the theoretical underpinnings of high-frequency repayment, a featurein nearly all microfinance contracts that has been largely overlooked by theorists. The pervasive belief among practitioners that frequent repayment is critical in achieving high repaymentrates is puzzling....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008860716

Public-Private Partnerships for the Provision of Public Goods: Theory and an Application to NGOs

Besley, Timothy; Ghatak, Maitreesh - London School of Economics and Political Science - 1999

This paper analyzes the role of public and private responsibility in the provision of publicgoods. We emphasize that a typical public good will require many different inputs whichraises the possibility of partnerships to exploit comparative advantages of different parties.But hold-up problems...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008860718