Showing 1 - 6 of 6
We present an experimental test of a shirking model where monitoring intensity is endogenous and effort a continuous … maximization problem of the firm. As a result, monitoring and pay should be complements. In our experiment, between and within …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255473
This discussion paper resulted in an article in 'Games and Economic Behavior' (2013). Volume 77, issue 1, pages 41-60.<P> Numerous gift exchange experiments have found a positive relationship between employers' wage offers and workers' effort levels. In (almost) all these experiments the employer...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255890
Although reciprocity is a key concept in the social sciences, it is still unclear why people engage in costly reciprocation. In this study, physiological and self-report measures were employed to investigate the role of emotions, using the Power-to-Take Game. In this 2-person game, player 1 can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256599
around. In this paper we test these predictions by means of a laboratory experiment. By and large our findings confirm …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256678
This discussion paper resulted in an article in the 'Economic Journal (2007). Volume 117, issue 522, pages 1025-1050.<P> One of the main findings of a large body of gift exchange experiments is that in an incomplete contracts environment workers on average do not shirk and usually provide more than...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256970
This paper investigates an implication of the self-serving bias for reciprocalresponses. It is hypothesized that negative intentionality matters more thanpositive intentionality for reciprocating individuals with a self-servingattributional style. Experimental evidence obtained in the hot...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257619