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The impact of payoff interdependence on trust and trustworthiness

Levati, M. Vittoria; Ploner, Matteo; Güth, Werner - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft - 2005

In one-shot investment game experiments where each player's payoff is a convex combination of own and other's profit, trust remains unaffected by the extent of interdependence whereas trustworthiness reacts positively to it.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005824111

Trust in cooperation or ability? – An experimental study on gender differences

Schwieren, Christiane; Sutter, Matthias - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft - 2003

We examine experimentally two different types of trust: trust in another party’s cooperation and trust in ability. In … the cooperation condition, player A sends x ? {0, X} to player B. The amount x is multiplied by c = 3, and B can return y … ability condition, but no significant effect in the cooperation condition. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005588002

How to Preserve a Fortune: An Experimental Comparison of Foundations and Direct Transfers to the Heir

Güth, Werner; Koschmieder, Kurt-Dieter; Levati, M. Vittoria - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft - 2005

Direct transfers allow heirs to freely use what has been passed on to them. Bequeathers who do not trust their descendants to make proper use of the fortune may prefer investing it in a safe foundation, thereby limiting their descendants' autonomy. In our study we compare experimentally these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765155

Partner selection in public goods experiments

Coricelli, Giorgio; Fehr, Dietmar; Fellner, Gerlinde - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft - 2003

This paper studies the e_ect of introducing costly partner selection for the voluntary contribution to a public good. Subjects participate in six sequences of five rounds of a two-person public good game in partner design. At the end of each sequence subjects can select a new partner out of six...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765142

When the past is present – The ratchet effect in the local commons

Fellner, Gerlinde; Margreiter, Magdalena; Eraso, Nuria Oses - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft - 2003

The indirect evolutionary approach integrates forward-looking evaluation of opportunities and adaptation in the light of the past. Subjective motivation determines behavior, but long-run evolutionary success of motivational types depends on objective factors only, what can justify intrinsic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005252202

Bargaining Outside the Lab - A Newspaper Experiment of a Three-Person Ultimatum Game

Schmidt, Carsten; Sutter, Matthias; Güth, Werner - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft - 2005

In a large scale newspaper experiment 5,132 readers of the German weekly, Die Zeit, participated in a three-person bargaining game. In our data analysis we focus on (1) the influence of age, gender, profession and the medium chosen for participation on bargaining behavior and on (2) the external...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005824107

Tournaments for the endogenous allocating of prizes within workteams - Theory and experimental evidence

Sutter, Matthias - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft - 2004

We present a model where compensation within a workteam is determined endogenously by the use of a rank-order tournament. Team members compete in their efforts for the right to propose the distribution of a prize within the team. The implementation of a proposal requires the approval of other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765090

On the Co-evolution of Retribution and Trustworthiness: An (Indirect) Evolutionary and Experimental Analysis

Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut; Levati, M. Vittoria; … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft - 2006

Standard economic explanations of good conduct in trade rely almost exclusively on future-directed extrinsic motivations induced by material incentives. But intrinsic motives to behave trustworthy and to punish untrustworthiness do support trade. In our model, intrinsically motivated players are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765093

Parimutuel Betting under Asymmetric Information

Koessler, Frederic; Noussair, Charles; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft - 2006

framework, earlier bets have information externalities, because they may reveal private information of bettors. They also have … payoff externalities, because they affect the betting odds. One effect of these externalities is that the separating …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765097

An Application of the English Clock Market Mechanism to Public Goods Games

Levati, Maria Vittoria; Neugebauer, Tibor - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft - 2001

We conducted a laboratory study with a public goods game in which contributions are not submitted all at once but incrementally as coordinated in real time by a clock. Individuals press a button as soon as the clock equals their willingness to contribute. This public goods institution exploits...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765099