Standard economic explanations of good conduct in trade rely almost exclusively on future-directed extrinsic motivations induced by material incentives. But intrinsic motives to behave trustworthy and to punish untrustworthiness do support trade. In our model, intrinsically motivated players are...

Whether incentive contracts perform better than trust in terms of productive efficiency is usually explored by principal-agent experiments (most involving only one agent). We investigate this issue in the context of a three-person ultimatum experiment, which is simpler and more neutrally framed...

Idiosyncratic risk attitudes are usually assumed to be commonly known and restricted to own payoffs. However, the alternatives faced by a decision maker often involve risks for others' payoffs as well. Motivated by the importance of other-regarding preferences in social interactions, this paper...

The goal of this paper is to provide an overview on the Virtual Laboratory infrastructure for online economic experiments. We summerize our experience gained from performing serveral economic experiments on the Internet. The experiments we have run range from electronic markets to individual...

The results of an asset market experiment, in which 64 subjects trade two assets on eight markets in a computerized continuous double auction, indicate that objectively irrelevant information influences trading behavior. Moreover, positively and negatively framed information leads to a...

This paper investigates (i) the robustness of hindsight bias in experimental asset markets, (ii) the time invariance of the different experimental risk elicitation methods of certainty equivalents and binary lottery choices, and (iii) their correspondence. The results of our within-subjects...

In this paper we report an experimental study of the ultimatum game in which subjects bargain for constant and slowly decreasing pies, over 3 and 11 rounds with either constant or alternating offers. With decreasing pies efficiency requires early agreements, whereas constant pies allow for late...

In this paper we study information revelation on asset markets with endogenous and exogenous information. Our results indicate that superior information can only be exploited in the beginning of trading. Information disseminates on the market and informational advantages are counter-balanced...

In a large scale newspaper experiment 5,132 readers of the German weekly, Die Zeit, participated in a three-person bargaining game. In our data analysis we focus on (1) the influence of age, gender, profession and the medium chosen for participation on bargaining behavior and on (2) the external...

In one-shot investment game experiments where each player's payoff is a convex combination of own and other's profit, trust remains unaffected by the extent of interdependence whereas trustworthiness reacts positively to it.