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Age and the development of trust and reciprocity

Sutter, Matthias; Kocher, Martin G. - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2003

We examine the degree of trust and reciprocity in an experimental trust game with 662 participants from six different … age groups, ranging from 8 year old primary school children to retired persons in their late sixties. Although both trust … research has devoted surprisingly little attention to their development with age. Our results provide clear evidence that trust …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866861

The investment game with asymmetric information

Coricelli, Giorgi; Morales, Luis Gonzalez; Mahlstedt, Amelie - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2003

We analyze the effects of introducing asymmetric information andexpectations in the investment game (Berg et al., 1995). In our experiment,only the trustee knows the size of the surplus. Subjects’expectations about each other’s behavior are also elicited. Our resultsshow that average payback...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866876

Monitoring and Pay:An Experiment on Employee Performance under Endogenous Supervisiona

Dittrich, Dennis A. V.; Kocher, Martin G. - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2006

We present an experimental test of a shirking model where monitoring intensityis endogenous and effort a continuous variable. Wage level, monitoring intensityand consequently the desired enforceable effort level are jointly determined bythe maximization problem of the firm. As a result,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866658

Wages, Length of Relationship and Bargaining Power:An experimental study in a world of complete contracts

Dittrich, Dennis A. V. - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2004

To explain potential sources of wage rigidity this article analyzes a model of reciprocalkindness applied to a repeated ultimatum game with changing and nonzeroconflict payoffs. The model is also tested in a laboratory experiment. The resultsare compatible with the rentsharingapproach to wage...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866814

Indirect Reciprocity in Cyclical Networks- An Experimental Study

Greiner, Ben; Levati, Maria Vittoria - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2003

A cyclical network of indirect reciprocity is derived organizing 3- or6-person groups into rings of social interaction where the first individualcan help the second, the second the third, and so on till the last, who inreturn can help the first. Mutual cooperation is triggered by assuming...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866914

Fairness versus Efficiency - An Experimental Study of (Mutual) Gift Giving

Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut; Ockenfels, Axel - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2002

Fairness is a strong concern as shown by dictator and ultimatum experiments. Efficiency, measured by the sum of individual payoffs, is a potentially competing concern in games such as the prisoners' dilemma. In our experiment participants can increase efficiency by gift giving. In the one-sided...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867006

Individual versus group behavior and the role of the decision making procedure in gift-exchange experiments

Kocher, Martin G.; Sutter, Matthias - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2002

We test for behavioral differences between groups and individuals in gift-exchange experiments. Related studies establish group behavior as typically closer to the game-theoretic equilibrium. We show that this result my depend crucially on the decision making procedure within groups. A novel...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867021

Firm Specific Investments Based on Trust and Hiring Competition:A Theoretical and Experimental Study of Firm Loyalty

Berninghaus, Siegfried K.; Gonzalez, Luis G.; Greiner, Ben - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2003

Two firms, each consisting of a team with the owner and just oneemployee, compete on the labor market with free labor mobility. Afterobserving the investment decisions by firm owners their employees canengage in costly training, thus increasing their general and firm-specificproductivity, which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866874