Data on contestants’ choices in Italian Game Show Affari Tuoi are analysed in a way that separatesthe effect of risk attitude (preferences) from that of beliefs concerning the amount ofmoney that will be offered to contestants in future rounds. The most important issue addressedin the paper is...

In this note we establish that rational demand expectations willtypically not evolve in an evolutionary model. In an evolutionarymodel beliefs act like a commitment device to more aggressive be-havior. This commitment effect has the same direction for strategicsubstitutes and complements and...

Taking seriously the philosophical foundations of classical strategic theories of choice-making we scrutinize to what extent planning on on equilibrium strategies can be justified "eductively" among rational players and how this can be utilized to analyze games by their "game-like"...

The variable threat-bargaining model of Nash (1953) assumes that threats in the senseof binding commitments as to what one will do if bargaining ends in conflict, are chosenbefore bargaining. By comparison, late threats to be chosen after bargaining end in conflict,appear more natural and would...

We test for behavioral differences between groups and individuals in gift-exchange experiments. Related studies establish group behavior as typically closer to the game-theoretic equilibrium. We show that this result my depend crucially on the decision making procedure within groups. A novel...

The indirect evolutionary approach integrates forward-looking evaluation of opportunitiesand adaptation in the light of the past. Subjective motivation determines behavior,but long-run evolutionary success of motivational types depends on objective factors only.This can justify intrinsic...