A common feature of the literature on the evolution of preferencesis that evolution favors nonmaterialistic preferences only if preferencetypes are observable at least to some degree. We argue that this resultis due to the assumption that in each state of the evolutionary dynam-ics some Bayesian...

We analyze the effect of investments in corporate social responsibility(CSR) on workers’ motivation. In our experiment, a gift exchange game variant,CSR is captured by donating a certain share of profits to a charity. Weare testing for CSR effects by varying the possible share of profits given...

Actual behaviour is inuenced in important ways by moral emotions,for instance guilt or shame (see among others Tangney et al., 2007). Belief-dependant models of social preferences using the framework of psycho-logical games aim to consider such emotions to explain other-regardingbehaviour. Our...

Recent research has cast some doubt on the general validity of outcome-basedmodels of social preferences. We develop a model based on cognitive dissonance thatfocuses on the importance of self-image. An experiment (a dictator game variant)tests the model.First, we nd that subjects whose choices...

Empirical evidences show that investors tend to be biased toward investing indomestic (home bias) and local (local bias) stocks. Familiarity is considered to be one of thereasons. A similar concept was proposed by Goldstein and Gigerenzer (1999, 2002), known asthe recognition heuristic: “when...

“Waste not want not” expresses our culture’s aversion to waste. “I could have gotten the samething for less” is a sentiment that can diminish pleasure in a transaction. We study people’s willingnessto “pay” to avoid this spoiler. In one scenario, participants imagined they were...

One-way communication has been found to substantially increasecontributions in linear voluntary contribution mechanisms. We confirmthe robustness of this result in the presence of income heterogeneity.

Whether behavior converges toward rational play or fair play in repeated ultimatum games depends on which player yields first. If responders concede first by accepting low offers, proposers would not need to learn to offer more, and play would converge toward unequal sharing. By the same token,...

In generosity games, one agreement payo is exogenously given,whereas the other is endogenously determined by the proposer's choice of the"pie" size. This has been shown to induce pie choices which are either efficiencyor equality seeking. In our experiment, before playing the generosity...

We augment a standard dictator game to investigate how preferences for an environmental project relate to willingness to limit others’ choices. We explore this issue by distinguishing three student groups: economists, environmental economists, and environmental social scientists. We find that...