Similar Search Results

Competition on Common Value Markets with Naive Traders– A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis

Chlaß, Nadine; Güth, Werner - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2007

Theoretically and experimentally, we generalize the analysis of acquiringa company (Samuelson and Bazerman 1985) by allowing for competition ofboth, buyers and sellers. Naivety of both is related to the idea that higherprices exclude worse qualities. While competition of naive buyers...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866465

Framing Effects, Selective Information andMarket Behavior An Experimental Analysis

Kirchler, Erich; Maciejovsky, Boris; Weber, Martin - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2004

continuous double auction, indicate that objectivelyirrelevant information influences trading behavior. Moreover, positively and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866816

Asymmetric Auction Experiments With(out) Commonly Known Beliefs

Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2002

Are commonly known beliefs essential for bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions? Our experimental results suggest that not informing participants how values are randomly generated does not change behavior much and may even make it appear more rational.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867012

Bidding in common value fair division games: The winner’scurse or even worse?

Becker, Alice; Brünner, Tobias - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2009

corresponding common value auction.Whereas symmetric risk neutral Nash equilibria are rather similar for both games,behavior differs …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005870973

Rules (of Bidding) to Generate Equal Stated Profits- An Axiomatic Approach -

Güth, Werner - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2010

Although one may hope to achieve equality of stated profits withoutenforcing it, one may not trust in such voluntary equality seeking andrather try to impose rules (of bidding) guaranteeing it.[...]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009022159

Specious Confidence after Tax Audits: A Contribution to theDynamics of Compliance

Kirchler, Erich; Maciejovsky, Boris; Schwarzenberger, … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2003

Dynamics of compliance, depending on audit probability, sanctions, and the time lagbetween audits, are investigated in a tax experiment. Compliance varied significantlyover time: it decreased immediately after an audit and increased afterwards, especially if audits were frequent and sanctions high.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866915

Privately Contributing to Public Goods over Time¤- An Experimental Study

Güth, Werner; Levati, Maria Vittoria; Stiehler, Andreas - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2002

Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participantscan vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing apublic good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contributiongradually or keep it constant. Groups of two poorly and two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867324

An Application of the English Clock MarketMechanism to Public Goods Games

Levati, Maria Vittoria; Neugebauer, Tibor - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2001

We conducted a laboratory study with a public goods game in which contributions are notsubmitted all at once but incrementally as coordinated in real time by a clock. Individualspress a button as soon as the clock equals their willingness to contribute. This publicgoods institution exploits the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867325

Unique Bid Auction Games

Rapoport, Amnon; Otsubo, Hironori; Kim, Ora; Stein, … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung …

Two auction mechanisms are studied in which players compete with one another for an exogenously determined prize by … lowest (highest) bid auction game, the winner of the prize is the player who submits the lowest (highest) bid provided that …-negative cost of entry, and an option to stay out of the auction if the entry cost is deemed too high, we propose an algorithm for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866428

Do prices in the unmediated call auction reflect insiderinformation? – An experimental analysis

Brünner, Tobias; Levinski, Rene - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2008

The unmediated call auction is a useful trading mechanism to aggregate dispersedinformation. Its ability to incorporate … auction game where both auction prices and limit prices of uninformed tradersre°ect potential insider information. The … predictions of the model are tested inthe laboratory. While an insider improves the call auction outcomes in terms ofincreasing …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866435