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House Allocation with Overlapping Agents: A DynamicMechanism Design Approach
Kurino, Morimitsu - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2009
Many real-life applications of house allocation problems are dynamic. For example, inthe case of on-campus housing for college students, each year freshmen apply to move inand graduating seniors leave. Each student stays on campus for a few years only. A studentis a \newcomer" in the beginning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009022173
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The Virtual Laboratory Infrastructure for Online Economic Experiments
Greiner, Ben; Jacobsen, Hans-Arno; Schmidt, Carsten - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2002
infrastructure and ultimately aim atproviding an Internet experiment service for the experimental economic researchcommunity. … experiments. We summarize our experience gainedfrom performing several economic experiments on the Internet. The experimentswe … methodological issues in performing economicexperiments on the Internet. As a result for further exploration we sketch thedesign of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867014
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Incentive Contracts versus Trust in Three-Person Ultimatum Games- An Experimental Study
Büchner, Susanne; Gonzalez, Luis; Güth, Werner; … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2002
-agent experiments (mostinvolving only one agent). We investigate this issue in the context of athree-person ultimatum experiment, which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867038
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The balanced solutionfor cooperative transferable utility games
Brink, René van den; Levínský, René; Zeleny, Miroslav - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2007
The Shapley value of a cooperative transferable utility game distributes the dividendof each coalition in the game equally among its members. Given exogenous weightsfor all players, the corresponding weighted Shapley value distributes the dividendsproportionally to their weights. In this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866535
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Motivational Cherry Picking
Regner, Tobias; Riener, Gerhard - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2011
We construct a simple three person trust game with one trustor and two trustees. The trustorhas the possibility to either trust both trustees or none, while the trustees make their decisionseither sequentially or simultaneously, depending on the treatment. When trustees play...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248883
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Collectively Ranking Candidates– An Axiomatic Approach
Güth, Werner - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2011
Different evaluators typically disagree how to rank different candidates since theycare more or less for the various qualities of the candidates. It is assumed that allevaluators submit vector bids assigning a monetary bid for each possible rank order.The rules must specify for all possible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248888
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Context and Interpretation in Laboratory Experiments:The Case of Reciprocity
Levati, Maria Vittoria; Miettinen, Topi; Rai, Birendra K. - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2010
The existing literature acknowledges that a mismatch between the experimenter'sand the subjects' models of an experimental task can adversely aect the interpretation ofdata from laboratory experiments. We discuss why the two common experimental designs(between-subjects and within-subjects) used...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248911
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On the Co-evolution of Retribution and Trustworthiness:An (Indirect) Evolutionary and Experimental Analysis
Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut; Levati, M. Vittoria; … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2006
Standard economic explanations of good conduct in trade rely almostexclusively on future-directed extrinsic motivations induced by materialincentives. But intrinsic motives to behave trustworthy and to punishuntrustworthiness do support trade. In our model, intrinsically motivatedplayers are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866698
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Framing Effects, Selective Information andMarket Behavior An Experimental Analysis
Kirchler, Erich; Maciejovsky, Boris; Weber, Martin - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2004
The results of an asset market experiment, in which 64 subjects trade two assets oneight markets in a computerized …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866816
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Hindsight Bias and Individual RiskAttitude within the Context ofExperimental Asset Markets
El-Sehity, Tarek; Haumer, Hans; Helmenstein, Christian; … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2002
This paper investigates (i) the robustness of hindsight bias in experimental assetmarkets, (ii) the time invariance of the different experimental risk elicitationmethods of certainty equivalents and binary lottery choices, and (iii) their correspondence.The results of our within-subjects...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867042