In this paper, we reexamine Eliaz's results (2002) of fault tolerantimplementation on one hand and we extend theorems 1 and 2 of Doghmi and Ziad (2008a) to bounded rationality environments, on the other. We identify weak versions of thek-no veto power condition, in conjunction with unanimity and...

Relying on the specific example of ultimatum bargaining experiments this paperexplores the possible role of empirical knowledge of behavioural “norm(ative)facts” within the search for (W)RE – (Wide) Reflective Equilibria on normativeissues. Assuming that “pro-social” behaviour...

A unique indivisible commodity with an unknown common value is owned bygroup of individuals and should be allocated to one of them while compensating theothers monetarily. We study the so-called fair division game (Güth, Ivanova-Stenzel,Königstein, and Strobel (2002, 2005)) theoretically and...

Norms play an important role in establishing social order. Thecurrent literature focuses on the emergence, maintenance and impactof norms with regard to coordination and cooperation. However, theissue of norm-related conict deserves more attention. We develop ageneral theory of \normative...

We study ultimatum and dictator experiments where the first moverchooses the amount of money to be distributed between the playerswithin a given interval, knowing that her own share is fixed. Thus, thefirst mover is faced with scarcity, but not with the typical trade-off betweenher own and the...

We run a computerised experiment of network formation where allconnections are bene…cial and only direct links are costly. Players simul-taneously submit link proposals; a connection is made only when bothplayers involved agree. We use both simulated and experimentally gen-erated data to test...

In this paper, we introduce the concept of payoff distortion inthe standard prisoner’s dilemma game when strategies are driven by psychologicalbehaviors. This concept enables to take account each player’s assessmentof the other player’s behavior and the asymmetry of information....

A common feature of the literature on the evolution of preferencesis that evolution favors nonmaterialistic preferences only if preferencetypes are observable at least to some degree. We argue that this resultis due to the assumption that in each state of the evolutionary dynam-ics some Bayesian...

We construct a simple three person trust game with one trustor and two trustees. The trustorhas the possibility to either trust both trustees or none, while the trustees make their decisionseither sequentially or simultaneously, depending on the treatment. When trustees play...

Actual behaviour is inuenced in important ways by moral emotions,for instance guilt or shame (see among others Tangney et al., 2007). Belief-dependant models of social preferences using the framework of psycho-logical games aim to consider such emotions to explain other-regardingbehaviour. Our...