We augment a standard dictator game to investigate how preferences for an environmental project relate to willingness to limit others’ choices. We explore this issue by distinguishing three student groups: economists, environmental economists, and environmental social scientists. We find that...

I conduct an experiment to assess whether majority voting on a nonbindingsharing norm affects subsequent behavior in a dictator game. Ina baseline treatment, subjects play a one shot dictator game. In a votingtreatment, subjects are first placed behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ and vote onthe...

A common feature of the literature on the evolution of preferencesis that evolution favors nonmaterialistic preferences only if preferencetypes are observable at least to some degree. We argue that this resultis due to the assumption that in each state of the evolutionary dynam-ics some Bayesian...

The existing literature acknowledges that a mismatch between the experimenter'sand the subjects' models of an experimental task can adversely aect the interpretation ofdata from laboratory experiments. We discuss why the two common experimental designs(between-subjects and within-subjects) used...

A simple two-person distribution game similar to the ultimatumgame is introduced. However, unlike the standard ultimatumgame, responders can determine the payoff for the proposerin case of rejection. Therefore, they can express their concerns inmonetary quantities. The experimental data are...

We analyze the effects of introducing asymmetric information andexpectations in the investment game (Berg et al., 1995). In our experiment,only the trustee knows the size of the surplus. Subjects’expectations about each other’s behavior are also elicited. Our resultsshow that average payback...

This article examines the nature of human behavior in a nested socialdilemma referred to as the Spillover Game. Players are divided into twogroups with positive production interdependencies. Based on theoreticallyderived opportunistic, local, and global optima, our experimental...

In this paper, we study a voluntary contribution mechanism withone-way communication. The relevance of one person’s words is assessedby assigning exogeniously the role of the ‘communicator’ to onegroup member. Contrary to the view that the mutual exchange ofpromises is necessary for the...

We construct a simple three person trust game with one trustor and two trustees. The trustorhas the possibility to either trust both trustees or none, while the trustees make their decisionseither sequentially or simultaneously, depending on the treatment. When trustees play...

E-nstructions facilitates the use of electronic instructions in computerized laboratory ex-periments in social sciences. In this article I provide a set of guidelines for the installationand the use of E-nstructions.