This note reports a replication study of Falk and Kosfeld’s (2006) medium control treatment.In the experimental game, an agent has an endowment of 120 experimental currency units anddecides how much to transfer to a principal. For every unit that the agent gives up, the principalreceives two...

We experimentally examine how group identity affects trust behaviorin an investment game. In one treatment, group identity isinduced purely by minimal groups. In other treatments, group membersare additionally related by outcome interdependence establishedin a prior public goods game. Moving...

Bereits im Jahre 1980 wählte Horst Albach einen spieltheoretischen und experimentellökonomischenZugang zum Vertrauensproblem in der Ökonomik. Dieser Weg wird erneutbeschritten. Es wird aufgezeigt, dass neuere spieltheoretische und experimentelle Arbeitennicht nur die explanativen Grenzen des...

Two traditional assumptions in neo-classical economics have beenmaterial self-interest and (commonly known) decision rationality. Sincethere is ample contradictory empirical evidence, many recent attemptshave been made to remodel the situation so that rational behavior ismore in line with actual...

We examine the degree of trust and reciprocity in an experimental trust game with 662 participants from six different age groups, ranging from 8 year old primary school children to retired persons in their late sixties. Although both trust and reciprocity have been identified as fundamental...

Two firms, each consisting of a team with the owner and just oneemployee, compete on the labor market with free labor mobility. Afterobserving the investment decisions by firm owners their employees canengage in costly training, thus increasing their general and firm-specificproductivity, which...

We analyze the effects of introducing asymmetric information andexpectations in the investment game (Berg et al., 1995). In our experiment,only the trustee knows the size of the surplus. Subjects’expectations about each other’s behavior are also elicited. Our resultsshow that average payback...

We examine experimentally two different types of trust: trust in another party's cooperation and trust in ability. In the cooperation condition, player A sends x{0,X} to player B. The amount x is multiplied by c=3, and B can return y{0,3x}. IN teh ability conditions, c depends on B's performance...