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Do prices in the unmediated call auction reflect insiderinformation? – An experimental analysis

Brünner, Tobias; Levinski, Rene - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2008

The unmediated call auction is a useful trading mechanism to aggregate dispersedinformation. Its ability to incorporate … auction game where both auction prices and limit prices of uninformed tradersre°ect potential insider information. The … predictions of the model are tested inthe laboratory. While an insider improves the call auction outcomes in terms ofincreasing …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866435

Asymmetric Auction Experiments With(out) Commonly Known Beliefs

Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2002

Are commonly known beliefs essential for bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions? Our experimental results suggest that not informing participants how values are randomly generated does not change behavior much and may even make it appear more rational.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867012

Unique Bid Auction Games

Rapoport, Amnon; Otsubo, Hironori; Kim, Ora; Stein, … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung …

Two auction mechanisms are studied in which players compete with one another for an exogenously determined prize by … lowest (highest) bid auction game, the winner of the prize is the player who submits the lowest (highest) bid provided that …-negative cost of entry, and an option to stay out of the auction if the entry cost is deemed too high, we propose an algorithm for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866428

Tournament Fever and the Perception of StrategicUncertainty in Performance Contests

Uske, Tobias - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2008

As firms implement tournament bonus reward schemes, mainly the idea is to introduce competition amongst their agents in the order to promote their performance.Tournaments in which agents compete for a bonus by investing effort, are frequentlyapplied, e.g., in development races, political...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866448

Competition on Common Value Markets with Naive Traders– A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis

Chlaß, Nadine; Güth, Werner - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2007

Theoretically and experimentally, we generalize the analysis of acquiringa company (Samuelson and Bazerman 1985) by allowing for competition ofboth, buyers and sellers. Naivety of both is related to the idea that higherprices exclude worse qualities. While competition of naive buyers...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866465

Collusion mechanisms in procurement auctions:An experimental investigation

Brosig, Jeannette; Güth, Werner; Weiland, Torsten - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2006

Collusive agreements are often observed in procurement auctions. They are probablymore easily achieved when competitors’ costs are easily estimated. If, however, the individualcosts of bidders are private information, effective ring formation is difficult to realize.We compare experimentally...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866708

The Effect of Monetary Feedback and Information Spillovers onCognitive Errors: Evidence from Competitive Markets

Budescu, David V.; Maciejovsky, Boris - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2004

A vast literature shows that individuals frequently violate normative principles in reasoning. In evaluatingthe relevance of these findings for psychology, economics, and related disciplines, it is natural to askwhether reasoning errors reflect random aberrations or systematic biases. One...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866768

Prices as indicators of scarcity - anexperimental study of a multistageauction

McDaniel, Tanga; Nicklisch, Andreas - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2004

The price mecanism is the primary means of information transferin decentralized economic systems. High prices indicate highdemand, whereas low prices indicate low demand. Thus prices arethe signals for accelerating or slowing production. However, usingsequential, multi-unit auctions, we show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866772

Framing Effects, Selective Information andMarket Behavior An Experimental Analysis

Kirchler, Erich; Maciejovsky, Boris; Weber, Martin - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2004

continuous double auction, indicate that objectivelyirrelevant information influences trading behavior. Moreover, positively and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866816

Interaction of Human and Artificial Agents on Double Auction MarketsSimulations and Laboratory Experiments

Grossklags, Jens; Schmidt, Carsten - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2003

This paper provides an overview on the simulations andexperiments we have done in order to better understandhuman-agent interaction in a market environment. We findthat the introduction of software agents does not necessarilyinduce a more efficient market. More surprisingly,information on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866907